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I. INTRODUCTION
This Survey Article addresses the area of criminal procedure by
examining some of the major decisions handed down by the Illinois
Supreme Court this past year. Of special significance were cases
decided in the areas of the defendant's rights under the fourth and
fifth amendments and the death penalty. Additionally, this Article
discusses some of the significant legislation passed in the Survey
period. Of the many laws passed during the Survey period, none
will likely have as large an impact as the statutory creation of a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. This Article con-
cludes with a discussion of the trends occurring in Illinois criminal
procedure.
II. ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Payton Violation and Subsequent Confession
In People v. White,' the State charged the defendant with the
offense of murder after he had confessed.2 At trial, the defendant
moved to suppress his confession on the ground that it was ob-
tained following an illegal arrest and, therefore, was the illegally
obtained "fruit of the poisonous tree."3 Specifically, the defendant
claimed that he was arrested in his home without a warrant in vio-
lation of the rule established by the Supreme Court in Payton v.
1. 117 Ill. 2d 194, 512 N.E.2d 677 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1469 (1988).
2. Id. at 201, 512 N.E.2d at 678.
3. Id. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963), the United States
Supreme Court ruled that a confession following an illegal arrest must be suppressed
unless the confession is "sufficiently an act of free-will to purge the primary taint of the
unlawful invasion."
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New York.4
The State argued that the defendant was not arrested in his
home but in his brother's home and that under Payton, the defend-
ant cannot claim this temporary residence as his home.- The State
advanced three additional arguments: that exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless arrest even if the Payton rule applied; that
the police's entry to arrest was consensual; and that even if the
defendant's arrest was unlawful, his later confession was not
tainted by the arrest.6 The trial court granted the defendant's mo-
tion and suppressed the confession as the product of an illegal
arrest. '
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court first examined the ques-
tion of whether a defendant may claim that a particular residential
premises is his home under Payton.s The court, noting that Payton
mandates a liberal construction of the definition of a suspect's
home,9 found that a residence is deemed to be a suspect's home if
"the suspect's association with a particular place provides that sus-
pect with a reasonable expectation of privacy such that he would
be justified in believing that he can retreat there, secure against
governmental intrusion." 10 The court listed several key criteria in
determining the intentions of the host and the suspect:
(1) whether the suspect is physically present at the host's resi-
dence for a substantial length of time prior to his arrest;
(2) whether the suspect maintains a regular or continuous pres-
ence in the host's residence and particularly whether he sleeps
4. White, 117 Ill. 2d at 201, 512 N.E.2d at 678 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573 (1980)). In Payton, the Court held that police may not, absent exigent circumstances,
enter a suspect's home to arrest a suspect without a warrant and reason to believe that the
suspect is present. Payton, 445 U.S. at 589.
5. White, 117 Ill. 2d at 209, 512 N.E.2d at 681.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 201, 512 N.E.2d at 678. The appellate court reversed the trial court in an
unpublished order, holding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. Id.
at 202, 512 N.E.2d at 678. The appellate court further found that even if exigent circum-
stances did not exist, the defendant could not claim his brother's home as his own. Id.
(citing People v. White, 132 Ill. App. 3d 1162, 494 N.E.2d 959 (1st Dist. 1985)).
8. Id. at 209, 512 N.E.2d at 681-82. The court observed that Payton did not define a
suspect's home and that this case presented an issue of first impression. Id.
9. The court, in mandating a liberal interpretation of a suspect's home, recognized
the Payton Court's focus on the "constitutional guarantee that the right of the people to
be secure in their ... houses . . . shall not be violated." Id. at 210, 512 N.E.2d at 682
(citing U.S. CONST. amends. IV, VI). Further, the court noted the Supreme Court's
holding in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), which extended the warrant
requirement to suspects who are arrested in the home of a third party. White, 117 Ill. 2d
at 210, 512 N.E.2d at 682. The court found that these two decisions operate to protect
the interests of a suspect in any dwelling. Id.
10. White, 117 Ill. 2d at 210, 512 N.E.2d at 682.
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there regularly; (3) whether the host grants the suspect exclusive
use of a particular area of the host's residence; (4) whether the
suspect stores his clothes or possessions in the host's residence;
(5) whether the suspect receives mail at the host's residence or
has his name on the door; (6) whether the suspect contributes to
the upkeep of the host's household ...; and (7) whether the
suspect and the host are related by blood or marriage."'
Applying these criteria to the instant case, the court concluded
that the defendant had a sufficient expectation of privacy because
he had no other home, he had been staying with his brother for
seven days prior to the arrest, and there was no limit upon the
length of the defendant's stay. 12
The court next considered the State's claim that exigent circum-
stances justified the warrantless arrest.' 3 It rejected the State's exi-
gency claim because the police delayed the investigation for at least
three days after obtaining probable cause to arrest.' 4 The court
also dismissed the State's contention that the police had the con-
sent of a third party to enter the home."' The court upheld the
trial court's finding that the purported consent was not voluntary
because the evidence showed that the police pushed past the third
party into the hallway of the apartment.' 6
Next, the court looked to Brown v. Illinois1 7 to determine
whether the defendant's confession was the fruit of his unlawful
arrest. I8 Significant among the Brown criteria was the length of the
defendant's detention after the arrest and before the confession -
"24 or more hours." 19 The court found that the twenty-four hour
detention, by itself, could induce the defendant to confess in the
absence of intervening circumstances.2 °
11. Id. at 212-13, 512 N.E.2d at 683.
12. Id. at 210-16, 512 N.E.2d at 682-85.
13. Id. at 216, 512 N.E.2d at 685.
14. Id. at 218-20, 512 N.E.2d at 686-87.
15. Id. at 221-22, 512 N.E.2d at 687.
16. Id.
17. 422 U.S. 590 (1975). The seminal case concerning the admissibility of statements
made after an illegal arrest is Brown. The Supreme Court in Brown used the following
factors to determine whether a confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest: "The temporal
proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances...
and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct." Id. at 603-04.
18. White, 117 Ill. 2d at 223, 512 N.E.2d at 688.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 224, 512 N.E.2d at 688. The State argued, however, that two intervening
circumstances offset this factor: the presence of a co-defendant in an adjoining room to
the defendant, and questioning by officers different from those who had illegally arrested
him. Id. at 225, 512 N.E.2d at 689. The court concluded that the proximity of the co-
defendant to the defendant was insignificant in the absence of any evidence that he had
[Vol. 20
1989] Criminal Procedure 395
Finally, the court dismissed the State's argument that because a
Payton violation involves a warrantless entry into a place where the
suspect has a sufficient expectation of privacy, any subsequent con-
fession made in a different location lacks a causal connection to the
violation.2" The court expressed reluctance to adopt such an inter-
pretation of Payton, which would require the suppression of only
physical evidence, not confessions.22
B. Probable Cause to Arrest
In People v. James,2 3 a co-defendant was brought in for question-
ing concerning a murder.24 During questioning, the co-defendant
confessed and implicated the defendant in the murder.25 Based on
that confession, the police arrested the defendant. 26 During inter-
rogation, the defendant also confessed to the murder.27
At trial, both defendants moved to suppress their confessions as
the fruit of illegal arrests.28 The defendant claimed that the police
did not have probable cause to arrest him because the co-defend-
ant's statement was too unreliable to establish probable cause.29
Although the trial court denied the defendant's motion, the appel-
late court reversed the decision, holding that the co-defendant's
uncorroborated statements failed to provide probable cause to
arrest the defendant.3 °
any contact with the defendant. Id. The court also dismissed the contention concerning
different officers on the ground that to accord significance to such a change in personnel
would permit the police to undermine the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine merely by
providing different officers for interrogation. Id. at 226, 512 N.E.2d at 689.
21. Id. at 228, 512 N.E.2d at 690.
22. Id. The court added: "[ajbsent some indication from the Supreme Court of the
United States that this position is correct, we decline to adopt it." Id.
23. 118 Ill. 2d 214, 514 N.E.2d 998 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 780 (1988).
24. Id. at 217-19, 514 N.E.2d at 999-1000.
25. Id. at 219, 514 N.E.2d at 1000.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 220, 514 N.E.2d at 1000. An arrest is lawful when a peace officer "has
reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed an of-
fense." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 107-2(c) (1987). "Reasonable grounds" is
equivalent to "probable cause." People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 236-37, 468 N.E.2d 147,
153 (1984).
Alternatively, the defendant claimed that even if his own arrest was lawful, the co-
defendant's arrest was unlawful and, therefore, the defendant's statements should be sup-
pressed as the illegal fruit of the co-defendant's arrest. James, 118 Ill. 2d at 220, 514
N.E.2d at 1000. Nevertheless, the court found that the defendant did not have standing
to challenge the co-defendant's arrest. Id. at 226, 514 N.E.2d at 1003.
30. James, 118 Ill. 2d at 219-20, 514 N.E.2d at 1000. The appellate court relied on
Wong Sun in reversing the trial court. People v. James, 149 Ill. App. 3d 214, 220, 500
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On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant
based upon the co-defendant's statement implicating the defend-
ant.3 The court found that the co-defendant's statement was sup-
ported by some "indicia of reliability"3 2 because he was not
induced to confess and his statement was corroborated by the of-
ficer at the scene of the crime.33 Accordingly, the court found that
the statement did establish probable cause and, therefore, reversed
the appellate court's decision.34
C Administrative Searches
In People v. Madison,3 two secretary-of-state police officers con-
ducted an administrative search of the records of the defendant's
licensed salvage yard.36  The search was conducted pursuant to
section 5-403 of the Illinois Vehicle Code37 to determine the accu-
racy of the records required to be kept by the Secretary of State.38
During the search, the officers discovered twenty-six vehicle certifi-
cates of title with incomplete assignments of title.39 The officers
then seized these titles without the permission of the defendant. 4'
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the
N.E.2d 474, 477 (Ist Dist. 1986). See supra note 3. The supreme court rejected the
appellate court's interpretation of Wong Sun as holding that "uncorroborated statements
by an arrestee can never constitute probable cause for the arrest of a co-offender." James,
118 Ill. 2d at 222, 514 N.E.2d at 1001.
31. James, 118 I11. 2d at 220-25, 514 N.E.2d at 1001-03.
32. The court employed a "totality of the circumstances" approach in the determina-
tion of probable cause, as established by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). James, 118 Ill. 2d at 223, 514 N.E.2d at 1002. This ap-
proach takes into consideration "all the various indicia of reliability attendant upon the
giving of the probable cause information." Id. The court recognized that a strong "indi-
cia of reliability.., is found in admissions against the penal interests of the party giving
the information." Id.
33. James, 118 Ill. 2d at 224-25, 514 N.E.2d at 1002-03.
34. Id. at 224-25, 514 N.E.2d at 1003.
35. 121 Ill. 2d 195, 520 N.E.2d 374 (1988).
36. Id. at 199, 520 N.E.2d at 376.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 5-403 (1987). "Section 5-403 permits author-
ized representatives of the Secretary of State, including police officers, to perform inspec-
tions of the records and premises of salvage yards for the purpose of determining the
accuracy and completeness of the required records." Madison, 121 Il1. 2d at 199, 520
N.E.2d at 376.
38. Madison, 121 Ill. 2d at 199, 520 N.E.2d at 376.
39. Id.
40. Id. The State charged the defendant with possessing motor vehicle certificates of
title with incomplete assignments of title, in violation of section 4-104 of the Illinois Vehi-
cle Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 4-104 (1987). Madison, 121 Ill. 2d at 198, 520
N.E.2d at 376.
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incomplete titles, arguing that section 5-403 did not give the police
officers the authority to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution
without a search warrant.4" The trial court granted the defendant's
motion on the grounds that the evidence was the product of an
illegal search and seizure.4 2
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that collecting evi-
dence for criminal prosecutions is not within the statute's narrow
scope of power given the State to conduct administrative
searches.43 Therefore, the court held that the evidence should have
been excluded. 44
III. SELF-INCRIMINATION
A. Uncounseled Post-Arrest Statements
In People v. Foster,45 the defendant was charged with three
counts of murder. 46 At an initial interrogation, the defendant in-
voked his right to remain silent pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona.47
Three hours later, while the defendant was still in custody, the po-
lice told him that a witness had given a statement implicating him
in the murders. 48 After the police rewarned the defendant of his
Miranda rights, they re-initiated the questioning.49 Subsequently,
the defendant stated that he understood his rights and confessed to
41. Madison, 121 Ill. 2d at 200, 520 N.E.2d at 377.
42. Id. at 198, 520 N.E.2d at 376.
43. Id, at 201, 520 N.E.2d at 377. The court also found that the plain language of
section 5-403(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code imposes a search warrant requirement. Id.
Section 5-403(6) provides:
In the event information comes to the attention of the individuals conducting an
inspection that may give rise to the necessity of obtaining a search warrant...
the individuals conducting such inspection may take all necessary steps to se-
cure the premises under inspection until the warrant application is acted upon
by a judicial officer.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch 95 1/2, para. 5-403(6) (1987).
44. Madison, 121 Ill. 2d at 201, 520 N.E.2d at 377. The court also rejected the State's
claim that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless search. Id. at 206, 520
N.E.2d at 379.
45. 119 Ill. 2d 69, 518 N.E.2d 82 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2044 (1988).
46. Id. at 75, 518 N.E.2d at 84.
47. Id. at 86, 518 N.E.2d at 89 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965)). In
Miranda, the Supreme Court declared that if during custodial interrogation an "individ-
ual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease ... [and] any statement taken after the person
invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or other-
wise." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
48. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d at 86, 518 N.E.2d at 89.
49. Id.
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the murders. 50
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress his confession on the
grounds that his assertion of his right to remain silent was not
"scrupulously honored." 51 The defendant contended that the in-
terrogators did not "scrupulously honor" his right to remain silent
in that he was questioned about the same crime that was the sub-
ject of the initial interrogation. 2 The trial court denied the defend-
ant's motion and he was convicted. 3
The Illinois Supreme Court held that because the defendant was
given his Miranda rights prior to the second interrogation and he
understood these rights, the trial court acted properly in admitting
the defendant's confession. The fact that the defendant was later
questioned about the same offense was not, in itself, sufficient to
establish that his right to remain silent was not "scrupulously
honored. 55
The supreme court in People v. St. Pierre56 addressed another
case involving a suspect's assertion of his right to remain silent. In
St. Pierre, the defendant claimed that his conviction and death sen-
tence should be overturned and a new trial ordered because the
trial court erred in failing to suppress inculpatory statements that
he made to the police following his arrest. 7 The defendant argued
that he had effectively invoked his right to counsel during an inter-
rogation; the statements he made after invoking his right to coun-
50. Id.
51. Id. at 84-85, 518 N.E.2d at 88-89. The defendant relied on Michigan v. Mosely,
423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975), in which the United States Supreme Court found that suspects
have a constitutionally-protected interest in having their right to remain silent "scrupu-
lously honored." The Mosely Court held that a statement made by a suspect, after he had
earlier expressed a desire to remain silent, was admissible if the police scrupulously
honored the suspect's right to remain silent. Id. In finding that a suspect's right to re-
main silent was scrupulously honored, the Court took into consideration the fact that the
suspect was being questioned about a different crime in the second interrogation. Id. at
106.
52. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d at 86, 518 N.E.2d at 89.
53. Id. at 79, 518 N.E.2d at 86.
54. Id. at 86, 518 N.E.2d at 89.
55. Id. The court relied on several appellate court decisions holding that requestion-
ing a defendant about the same crime does not preclude the finding that the State scrupu-
lously honored the defendant's right to remain silent. Id. at 87, 518 N.E.2d at 89. See,
e.g., People v. Fleming, 103 Ill. App. 3d 194, 431 N.E.2d 16 (1st Dist. 1981) (Miranda
rights were scrupously honored when defendant was re-questioned about the same crime
one hour and forty-five minutes after the initial interrogation).
The court also found, notwithstanding the defendant's objections, that the police had
probable cause to arrest the defendant. The defendant's statements, therefore, were not
the fruit of an illegal arrest. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d at 84, 518 N.E.2d at 88.
56. 122 Ill. 2d 95, 522 N.E.2d 61 (1988).
57. Id. at 107, 522 N.E.2d at 65.
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sel were the product of further police interrogation.58 Thus, under
the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Edwards v.
Arizona,59 his confession was inadmissible.'
In contrast, the State argued that the defendant never effectively
invoked his right to counsel; rather, he was ambiguous about
whether he wished to have counsel present during the interroga-
tion.61 Alternatively, the State argued that even if the defendant
had invoked this right, he waived it by answering further
questions.62
On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant clearly invoked his right to counsel.63 Furthermore, the
court held that the defendant did not later waive this right by re-
sponding to further interrogation; his continued conversation with
the state's attorney did not evince a desire to discuss the criminal
investigation with the police.64 The court explained that under the
Edwards test, an unequivocal request for counsel cannot be over-
come solely by an accused's post-request response to further inter-
58. See id.
59. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86 n.9 (1981), the Supreme Court es-
tablished a two-pronged test to determine whether the defendant had waived his previ-
ously invoked right to counsel. The Edwards test requires a showing "that (1) the suspect
initiated further communication with the police that demonstrates a desire to discuss the
criminal investigation, and (2) as a separate matter and under the particular facts and
circumstances of the case, that his purported waiver was knowing and intelligent." St.
Pierre, 122 I11. 2d at 112, 522 N.E.2d at 68.
60. St. Pierre, 122 Ill. 2d at 109-10, 522 N.E.2d at 67.
61. Id. at 111, 522 N.E.2d at 67.
62. Id.
63. Id. The following dialogue occurred between the defendant and the state's attor-
ney prior to the interrogation:
Q. Do you understand that if you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be
appointed by the court to represent you before any questioning?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you wish one?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you like to speak to a lawyer now?
A. No, no, after, that comes after, right?
Q. You could have a lawyer if you want one.
A. No, that's okay ....
Id. at 108, 522 N.E.2d at 66.
The court also looked at the decision in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984), in
which the United States Supreme Court held that post-request responses are relevant
only to the question of waiver and cannot be used to cast doubt on the question of
whether the defendant ever invoked his right to counsel in the first place. St. Pierre, 122
I11. 2d at 112, 522 N.E.2d at 68.
64. St. Pierre, 122 Ill. 2d at 113, 522 N.E.2d at 68. The Supreme Court clearly stated
that as an express precondition for a finding of waiver, it must be shown that the suspect,
rather than the police, re-opened the dialogue. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485.
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rogation or his willingness to make a statement without an
attorney present.65 The court, therefore, reversed the decision of
the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial.66
B. Waiver of the Right to Remain Silent
In People v. Holland,67 the defendant was convicted of numerous
serious crimes.68 The defendant appealed, contending that an in-
culpatory statement that he made during a post-arrest interroga-
tion should have been suppressed due to a violation of his Miranda
rights. 69 The appellate court agreed with the defendant, finding the
waiver of his Miranda rights not valid because he was not notified
that an attorney was attempting to see him.7°
In addressing whether the defendant had validly waived his Mi-
randa rights, the Illinois Supreme Court looked to the United
States Supreme Court decision in Moran v. Burbine71 for guidance
and distinguished its own holding in People v. Smith.72 In Smith,
the court had held that there could be no valid waiver under Mi-
randa when an accused was not told that an attorney was attempt-
ing to see him.73 Whereas, in Burbine, the Supreme Court held
that a defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda
rights did not require knowledge that an attorney had been at-
tempting to see him.74 The court found that Holland, like the de-
fendant in Burbine, was unaware that his relative was securing
counsel for him. 5 In contrast, the defendant in Smith had already
met with and personally retained the attorney. 76 Therefore, the
court held that the defendant had validly waived his Miranda
rights. 7
65. St. Pierre, 122 Ill. 2d at 113, 522 N.E.2d at 68. The court also noticed the defend-
ant's obvious confusion would bar a" finding that his waiver was made knowingly and
intelligently. Id.
66. Id. at 116, 522 N.E.2d at 69.
67. 121 Ill. 2d 136, 520 N.E.2d 270 (1987), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989).
The defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, rape, deviate sexual assault,
armed robbery, and aggravated battery. Id.
68. Id. at 140, 520 N.E.2d at 272.
69. Id. The defendant argued that any claimed waiver of his Miranda rights was not
valid because the waiver was not made knowingly. Id. at 141-42, 520 N.E.2d at 272.
70. See People v. Holland, 147 Ill. App. 3d 323, 332, 497 N.E.2d 1230, 1236-37 (1st
Dist. 1986).
71. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
72. Holland, 121 Ill. 2d at 151-53, 520 N.E.2d at 277.
73. People v. Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179, 189, 442 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (1982).
74. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422-23.
75. Holland, 121 Ill. 2d at 153, 520 N.E.2d at 277.
76. Smith, 93 Ill. 2d at 184, 442 N.E.2d at 1327.
77. Holland, 121 Ill. 2d at 153, 520 N.E.2d at 277-78. Although the Court in
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C. Plea Agreement
In People v. Navarroli,7" the defendant was charged with unlaw-
ful possession of cocaine and unlawful possession of cocaine with
intent to deliver. 79 The state's attorney and the defendant entered
into plea negotiations.80 The defendant claimed that as a result of
these negotiations an agreement was reached whereby he would act
as an informant in exchange for a reduction of charges, a sentence
of probation, and a fine."' After the State denied the existence of
this agreement, the defendant moved to compel the State to carry
out the plea agreement.8 2 The trial court found that the evidence
supported the existence of the agreement, and thereby ordered spe-
cific performance of the agreement.8 3 The appellate court, how-
ever, reversed the order of the trial court.8 4
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendant
was not entitled to specific performance of the agreement because
the State's repudiation of the claimed bargain did not deprive him
of any constitutionally-protected interest."' The court relied on its
prior decision in People v. Boyt.8 6 In Boyt, the court held that a
defendant did not have a constitutional right under the due process
clause to have an agreement enforced unless the State's repudiation
of the agreement would deprive the defendant of some constitu-
Burbine had stated that "[n]othing we say today disables the States from adopting differ-
ent requirements for the conduct of its employees and officials as a matter of state law,"
the court in Holland declined to adopt a more stringent standard for a waiver of a sus-
pect's Miranda rights. Id. at 152-53, 520 N.E.2d at 277 (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at
428). The court also held that a Caucasian defendant does not have standing to object to
the State's use of the peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the petit jury. Id. at
157, 520 N.E.2d at 279 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide this issue. 57 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1989).
78. 121 Ill. 2d 516, 521 N.E.2d 891 (1988).
79. Id. at 519, 521 N.E.2d at 891-92.
80. Id. at 519, 521 N.E.2d at 892.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. The trial court found that the plea agreement must be specifically enforced
"[t]o preserve the sanctity of justice." Id. at 520, 521 N.E.2d at 892.
84. See People v. Navarroli, 146 Ill. App. 3d 466, 497 N.E.2d 128 (3d Dist. 1986).
85. Navarroli, 121 Ill. 2d at 524, 521 N.E.2d at 894. The court followed the approach
set forth by the Supreme Court in Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984). Navarroli, 121
Ill. 2d at 522-24, 521 N.E.2d at 893-94. The Mabry Court explained that:
A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is
a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court,
does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected
interest. It is the ensuing guilty plea that implicates the Constitution.
Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507-08.
86. Navarroli, 121 Ill. 2d at 524, 521 N.E.2d at 894 (citing People v. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d
403, 488 N.E.2d at 264 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1143 (1986)).
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tionally-protected interest.8 7 The Navarroli court reasoned that be-
cause the defendant did not plead guilty in reliance on the
agreement, the defendant was still free to plead not guilty; there-
fore, he had not been deprived of any right.88
IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A. Lesser Included Offense
In People v. Jackson,89 the court addressed the issue of whether
the double jeopardy clause barred a reckless homicide prosecution
because of a prior conviction for driving under the influence of al-
cohol ("D.U.I.").9 ° In Jackson, the defendant pleaded guilty to a
D.U.I.91 charge involving an automobile crash which killed a pas-
senger in the defendant's car.9 2 Three weeks later, the State moved
to enter an order of nolle prosequi to the charges. 93 After another
two weeks, the defendant was indicted for reckless homicide. 94
The indictment alleged that the defendant's reckless act was driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol. 95 The defendant moved to dis-
miss count two on double jeopardy grounds, claiming that his prior
D.U.I. conviction automatically established one or more of the es-
sential elements of reckless homicide. 96 Thus, the defendant con-
tended that the two offenses were the same under the analysis set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Ohio.97 In
Brown, the Supreme Court held that if a first lesser offense is a
necessary element of a second greater offense, then the two offenses
are the same and the double jeopardy clause bars a subsequent
prosecution of the greater offense.9 The trial court in Jackson
87. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d at 414-15, 488 N.E.2d at 270.
88. Navarroli, 121 111. 2d at 524, 521 N.E.2d at 894. The court also rejected the de-
fendant's claim that he was deprived of his first, fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment rights
in reliance on the plea agreement. Id. at 524-27, 521 N.E.2d at 894-95.
89. 118 Ill. 2d 179, 514 N.E.2d 983 (1987).
90. Id. at 183, 514 N.E.2d at 984.
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501 (1987).
92. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d at 183, 516 N.E.2d at 984.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 187, 514 N.E.2d at 986 (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1987)).
98. Brown, 432 U.S. at 168. The opposite also will result in a double jeopardy viola-
tion. Thus, "[if] a person is convicted of the more serious offense, he may not be subse-
quently prosecuted for an offense consisting solely of one or more elements of the crime
for which he has already been prosecuted." Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d at 187, 514 N.E.2d at 986
(citing Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682-83 (1977)).
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granted the defendant's motion and the appellate court affirmed. 99
In determining whether the two offenses were the same for pur-
poses of double jeopardy, the court recognized United States
Supreme Court decisions requiring courts to apply the double jeop-
ardy test by "focus[ing] on the proof necessary to prove the statu-
tory elements of each offense, rather than on the actual evidence to
be presented at trial."' 1 Based on these decisions, the court over-
ruled its earlier decision in People v. Zegart.1° 1 The Zegart court,
in applying the "same offense" analysis, focused on the evidence
used to prove the two offenses, rather than on the statutory ele-
ments of each offense. 0 2 The Jackson court conceded that its deci-
sion in Zegart was wrong in light of the United State's Supreme
Court's holding in Illinois v. Vitale,°a which reaffirmed the holding
in Blockburger v. United States."°
The Jackson court then held that the D.U.I. conviction did not
conclusively establish the "reckless act" element in reckless homi-
cide. 105 Rather, a D.U.I. conviction is merely some evidence of a
reckless act."0 6 The court based its decision on the language of the
reckless homicide statute,1 0 7 which provides that "being under the
influence of alcohol at the time of the alleged violation shall be
prima facie evidence of a reckless act."108 Therefore, the court
99. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d at 183, 514 N.E.2d at 984. See People v. Jackson, 144 Ill.
App. 3d 131, 494 N.E.2d 511 (3d Dist. 1986).
100. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d at 186, 514 N.E.2d at 988 (citing Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S.
410, 416 (1980)).
101. Id.
102. People v. Zegart, 83 Ill. 2d 440, 445, 415 N.E.2d 341, 343 (1980).
103. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
104. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d at 188, 514 N.E.2d at 985 (citing Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)). The Blockburger Court held that the "same offense" test
should focus on the proof necessary to prove the elements of the offense rather than on
the actual evidence presented at trial. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 166. The Zegart court
barred a prosecution for reckless homicide because the State conceded that in proving
reckless homicide, it would rely on the fact that the defendant had driven across a median
strip - the basis of a prior traffic conviction. Zegart, 83 Ill. 2d at 445, 415 N.E.2d at
341. In focusing on the evidence of the offenses to determine if the two offenses were the
same, rather than on the statutory elements, the Zegart court relied on dicta from the
decision in Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980). Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d at 184, 514 N.E.2d
at 985. In Vitale, the United States Supreme Court seemed to qualify the holding of
Blockburger: "[I]f in the pending manslaughter prosecution Illinois relies on and proves a
failure to slow to avoid an accident as the reckless act necessary to prove manslaughter,
Vitale would have a substantial claim of double jeopardy ...... Vitale, 447 U.S. at 421.
105. Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d at 190, 514 N.E.2d at 988.
106. Id. at 190-91, 514 N.E.2d at 988.
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3(b) (1987).
108. Jackson, 115 Ill. 2d at 190, 514 N.E.2d at 988 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 9-3(b) (1987)).
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concluded that the defendant was not put in jeopardy twice. 109
B. The Death Penalty Sentencing Stage
In People ex rel Daley v. Strayhorn,"0 the defendant was con-
victed of murder. 11I At the beginning of the sentencing hearing,
the defendant moved to preclude the imposition of the death pen-
alty. 1 2 Judge Strayhorn granted the defendant's motion and sen-
tenced the defendant to forty years of imprisonment.1 13
Subsequently, the State sought a writ of mandamus and prohibi-
tion or, in the alternative, a supervisory order to compel Judge
Strayhorn to vacate the sentence and remand the case for a death
sentencing hearing." 4
The defendant contended that the trial judge already held a
death penalty hearing and that remanding the case for a second
death penalty hearing would constitute double jeopardy. 1 5 The Il-
linois Supreme Court held, however, that the defendant was never
put in jeopardy because the trial judge did not hold the first phase
of the statutory bifurcated capital sentencing hearing. 1 6 Rather,
the trial judge was merely acting in response to the defendant's
motion to preclude the imposition of the death penalty." 7
V. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Conflict of Interest
In People v. Jones,"" the Illinois Supreme Court consolidated
109. Id. at 193, 514 N.E.2d at 989.
110. 121 Ill. 2d 470, 521 N.E.2d 864 (1988).
111. Id. at 472, 521 N.E.2d at 865.
112. Id. at 473, 521 N.E.2d at 865.
113. Id. at 473-74, 521 N.E.2d at 865-66. The trial judge ruled that the defendant
was ineligible to be sentenced to death because a previous Rhode Island murder would
not constitute an aggravating factor under the Illinois death penalty statute. Id. See infra
notes 313-25 and accompanying text.
114. Strayhorn 121 I11. 2d at 475, 521 N.E.2d at 866.
115. Id., at 476, 521 N.E.2d at 866-67. The defendant relied on the United States
Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1984), in which the
Court held that following a reversal and retrial of a conviction, the double jeopardy
clause prohibits states from sentencing defendants to death at the second sentencing
proceeding.
116. Strayhorn, 121 Ill. 2d at 479, 521 N.E.2d at 868. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 9-1(g) (1987).
117. Strayhorn, 121 Ill. 2d at 479, 521 N.E.2d at 868. The court reasoned that the
proceeding involving the defendant's motion to preclude the death penalty resembled
routine preliminary motion proceedings, which are not sufficient to place one in jeopardy.
Id. (citing People v. Shields, 76 Ill. 2d 543, 394 N.E.2d 1161 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
917 (1980)).
118. 121 Ill. 2d 21, 520 N.E.2d 325 (1988).
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two cases to address a conflict of interest issue. 119 Specifically, the
court determined whether the joint representation of two defend-
ants violates the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel when it is alleged that the admission at trial of inculpatory
and inconsistent pretrial statements from each defendant created a
conflict of interest. 120
In the first case, defendants Harris and Jones were represented
jointly at trial and both were convicted and sentenced to nine years
of imprisonment. 121 Following their arrests, both defendants made
exculpatory statements to a state's attorney.'22 Jones told the
state's attorney that he was present when Harris robbed the vic-
tim.123 Harris told the state's attorney that there had been no rob-
bery, but rather that a fight broke out with the victim when a drug
deal went sour. 24 These statements were admitted into evidence
by the testimony of an assistant state's attorney. 25 At trial, Jones
testified; he denied the statement attributed to him and adopted
Harris's version of the events. 26
On appeal, Harris contended that this joint representation cre-
ated a per se conflict of interest. 2  The court concluded that no
actual conflict of interest existed because Harris's statement excul-
pated Jones and Jones's testimony repudiated his prior statement
that had incriminated Harris. 12s By virtue of the repudiation, the
court reasoned that Jones, in effect, became a witness for Harris. 29
Therefore, the court found that Harris's defense was not adversely
119. Id. at 24, 520 N.E.2d at 327.
120. Id. The right to effective assistance of counsel is a fundamental right and enti-
tles the person to undivided loyalty of counsel. People v. Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d 109, 111, 239
N.E.2d 441, 443. The defendants did not raise the potential conflict of interest at trial.
Jones, 121 Ill. 2d at 25-26, 520 N.E.2d at 327. Under Hollaway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475, 487 (1978), once a potential or possible conflict is brought to the attention of the trial
court, the court must address it. When a possible conflict is not brought to the attention
of the trial court, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating that an actual conflict of
interest affected his representation, although he need not show prejudice. Cuyler v. Sulli-
van, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980).
121. Jones, 121 Ill. 2d at 24, 520 N.E.2d at 326.
122. Id. at 25, 520 N.E.2d at 327.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 26, 520 N.E.2d at 327-28.
127. Id. at 30, 520 N.E.2d at 329-30.
128. Id. at 31, 520 N.E.2d at 330. The court overruled People v. Cade, 97 Ill. App.
3d 354, 422 N.E.2d 1002 (1st Dist. 1981), which stood for the proposition that the intro-
duction of mutually inculpatory, inconsistent statements created a per se conflict of inter-
est when the two defendants are represented by the same attorney. Jones, 121 Ill. 2d at
31, 521 N.E.2d at 330.
129. Jones, 121 Ill. 2d at 31, 521 N.E.2d at 330.
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affected by his counsel's inability to cross-examine Jones. 30
In the second case, defendants Mosely and Ross were jointly
represented at trial after being charged with three counts of mur-
der and one count of armed robbery.' The principal evidence at
trial consisted of the defendants' pretrial inculpatory statements,
which differed in that each defendant claimed to have participated
only as a lookout. 32 At trial, Mosely testified that his statement
was coerced and that neither of them had anything to do with the
crimes. 133 Ross, on the other hand, did not testify.
34
The supreme court held that a clear conflict of interest existed
only in Mosely's case.'35 Because Ross declined to testify, the ad-
mission of his pretrial statement implicating Mosely violated
Mosely's right to confrontation. 136 The court reasoned that coun-
sel acting for Mosely could not effectively respond to Ross's incul-
patory statement absent an opportunity to cross-examine Ross. 1 37
As to Ross, however, defense counsel had no conflict of interest
because Mosely had testified and repudiated his confession as aproduct of coercion.138 Thus, Ross occupied the same position as
that occupied by Harris in the first case; Mosely in effect became a
witness for Ross. 3 9
In People v. Spreitzer,140 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
130. Id. at 30, 520 N.E.2d at 329.
131. Id. at 26, 520 N.E.2d at 328.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 31, 520 N.E.2d at 330.
134. Id. The appellate court held that the admission of the inculpatory statements
created a conflict of interest; each defendant became a witness against the other, and the
defense counsel could not cross-examine either of them. People v. Ross, 138 111. App. 3d
1089, 1098, 487 N.E.2d 68, 74 (1st Dist. 1985).
135. Jones, 121 Ill. 2d at 32, 520 N.E.2d at 330.
136. Id. at 34, 520 N.E.2d at 331. A defendant's sixth amejndment right to confron-
tation is violated when a trial court admits an out-of-court hearsay statement made by a
declarant who is not available for a "full and effective" cross-examination. Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968). For a discussion of Bruton and the right to
confrontation, see supra note 238 and accompanying text.
137. Jones, 121 Ill. 2d at 33-34, 520 N.E.2d at 331.
138. Id. at 33, 520 N.E.2d at 331.
139. Id. In finding that Ross was not denied effective assistance of counsel due to a
conflict of interest, the court relied on Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971). Jones, 121
Ill. 2d at 34, 520 N.E.2d at 331. In Nelson, the United States Supreme Court held that no
denial of a defendant's sixth amendment rights occurs when "his codefendant takes the
stand, denies making the alleged out-of-court statement implicating the defendant, and
testifies favorably to the defendant concerning the underlying facts." Nelson, 402 U.S. at
629. Because Mosely's repudiation of the statement inculpating Ross removed any hostil-
ity between Ross and Mosely, Ross had no need to impeach Mosely. Jones, 121 Ill. 2d at
33-34, 520 N.E.2d at 331.
140. 123 Ill. 2d 1, 525 N.E.2d 30 (1988).
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another case concerning an alleged conflict of interest. 14' In
Spreitzer, the assistant state's attorney who initially brought
charges against the defendant was appointed Public Defender for
DuPage County prior to the defendant's trial.14 2 At the same time,
the defendant was being represented at trial by an assistant public
defender. 143 The defendant argued that his counsel did not render
effective assistance because she was reluctant to question the case
brought by her new employer. 144
The court determined that the defendant failed to demonstrate
any specific defect in his counsel's strategy, decision-making, or
tactics that could have resulted from a conflict of interest. 4 5
Therefore, no actual or per se conflict of interest existed. 46
In People v. Hillenbrand,'41 the defendant was convicted of two
counts of murder. 41 On appeal, the defendant contended that he
was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney pre-
viously had rendered legal assistance to the murder victim's par-
ents, thereby creating a per se conflict of interest.'49
The court observed that under its previous decisions, the defend-
ant must demonstrate that his attorney had a "contemporaneous
141. Id. at 12-13, 525 N.E.2d at 33.
142. Id. at 12, 525 N.E.2d at 33.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 13, 525 N.E.2d at 34.
145. Id. at 18, 23, 525 N.E.2d at 36, 38. The court noted that the defendant had the
burden of demonstrating that the alleged conflict of interest actually affected his counsel's
performance because the trial court was not apprised of the potential conflict. Id. at 19,
525 N.E.2d at 36. See supra note 120.
146. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 23, 525 N.E.2d at 38. The court also refused to apply one
of the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice to find a per se conflict of interest. Id. at 20,
525 N.E.2d at 37. The standard at issue provided that "[i]t is unprofessional conduct for
a lawyer to defend a criminal case in which the lawyer's partner or other professional
associate is or has been the prosecutor." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 4-
3.5(d) (2d ed. 1986).
The court also concluded that the defendant was not prejudiced by improper state-
ments made by the prosector during the sentencing hearing. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 35-
39, 525 N.E.2d at 44-46. Finally, the court concluded that the defendant was sentenced
improperly to an extended term of 60 years of imprisonment for aggravated kidnapping.
Id. at 48, 525 N.E.2d at 50.
147. 121 Ill. 2d 537, 521 N.E.2d 900 (1988). The defendant pled guilty to both
counts of murder. Id. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at 541-42, 521 N.E.2d at 901 (citing
People v. Hillenbrand, 146 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 497 N.E.2d 798 (3d Dist. 1986)).
148. Id. at 541, 521 N.E.2d at 901.
149. Id. at 543, 521 N.E.2d at 902. The defendant claimed that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because at the time the defendant
entered his guilty plea, his attorney had a per se conflict of interest. Id.
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conflicting professional commitment to another,"' 5 ° although the
defendant need not prove actual prejudice. 1 ' The court held that
the defendant's attorney was not operating under a conflict of in-
terest because he had ceased to provide legal service to the victim's
family before representing the defendant and the attorney was not
held on a retainer basis by the victim's family.' 5 2
B. When Right to Counsel Attaches
In People v. Thompkins, 53 the defendant made an inculpatory
statement when questioned by police in a lock-up adjacent to the
courtroom while awaiting his initial court appearance. 154 This
statement was admitted into evidence and the defendant was con-
victed. 5 The defendant argued that the police obtained this state-
ment after his sixth amendment right to counsel had attached,
without counsel being present. 5 6 In contrast, the State argued that
the defendant's sixth amendment rights had not attached because
when the statement was taken, only a complaint for preliminary
examination charging defendant with murder had been issued. 57
In determining whether the defendant's sixth amendment rights
had attached, the court relied on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Kirby v. Illinois.' The Court in Kirby held
that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches after the "initi-
150. Id. at 544-45, 521 N.E.2d at 903 (citing People v. Free, 112 Ill. 2d 154, 492
N.E.2d 1269, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986)).
151. Id. at 544, 521 N.E.2d at 903 (citing People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 429, 430 N.E.2d
994 (1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1053 (1983)). The court stated "that allegations and
proof of prejudice are unnecessary in cases where defense counsel, without the knowl-
edgeable assent of the defendant, might not have an undivided loyalty to his client be-
cause of his commitments to others." Id. at 544, 521 N.E.2d at 902 (citing People v.
Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d 109, 239 N.E.2d 441 (1968)).
152. Id. at 545, 521 N.E.2d at 903. Additionally, the defendant argued that although
his attorney was no longer representing any of the victim's family, he still had a financial
interest in maintaining good relations with them. Id. at 545-46, 521 N.E.2d at 903. The
court, however, dismissed this argument as "speculative at best." Id. at 547, 521 N.E.2d
at 904.
153. 121 Ill. 2d 401, 521 N.E.2d 38 (1988).
154. Id. at 430, 521 N.E.2d at 50.
155. Id. at 413, 521 N.E.2d at 42.
156. Id. at 430, 521 N.E.2d at 50. Alternatively, the defendant argued that he gave
the statement after he had invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 433, 521
N.E.2d at 51. The court found that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelli-
gently waived this right. Id. at 433-34, 521 N.E.2d at 51-52. The right to counsel pro-
vided by the sixth amendment exists independently of those rights under the fifth
amendment. See People v. Owens, 102 Ill. 2d 88, 464 N.E.2d 261 (1984).
157. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d at 433, 521 N.E.2d at 51.
158. Id. (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)).
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ation of adversarial judicial criminal proceedings." 5 9  The
Thompkins court found that the State had not initiated adversary
judicial criminal proceedings prior to obtaining the statement; a
complaint for preliminary examination, without more, does not au-
tomatically commence the prosecution.16°
C. Waiver of Right to Counsel
In People v. Johnson,'6 1 the trial court failed to advise the de-
fendant that he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of life im-
prisonment because of a previous murder sentence. 62  The
defendant contended that the trial court violated Supreme Court
Rule 401(a) 163 by not adequately admonishing him of the mini-
mum and maximum sentences to which he could be subjected to,
before allowing his waiver of counsel."6 The defendant claimed
that, due to the trial court's improper admonishment, his waiver
was not made knowingly and intelligently.
65
The court held that although the defendant was not specifically
advised of the potential sentences he faced, substantial compliance
with rule 401(a) was sufficient to support a valid waiver of coun-
sel. 166 The court found that the trial court substantially complied
with rule 401(a) because it advised the defendant of his right to be
represented, explained the phases of the death penalty hearing and
the right to a jury during those phases, and because the record
159. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90. The Court in Kirby stated that "judicial criminal
proceedings are initiated when the State has committed itself to prosecute and . . . the
adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified." Id.
160. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d at 433, 521 N.E.2d at 51. An indictment, information,
preliminary hearing, or arraignment typically commences the prosecution. Kirby, 406
U.S. at 689.
161. 119 Ill. 2d 119, 518 N.E.2d 100 (1987). The defendant was convicted of four
counts of murder and four counts of felony-murder and sentenced to death on each count
of felony-murder. Id. at 122-23, 518 N.E.2d at 102.
162. Id. at 129, 518 N.E.2d at 105.
163. ILL. S. CT. R. 401(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 401(a) (1987). Supreme
Court Rule 401(a) provides:
Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a
waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment
without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing
him of and determining that he understands the following: (1) the nature of the
charge; (2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including,
when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because
of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and (3) that he has a right to
counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the court.
Id.
164. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d at 130, 518 N.E.2d at 105.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 132, 518 N.E.2d at 106.
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revealed that the defendant was aware of the minimum sentence to
which he would be subject.167
D. Effective Assistance of Counsel
In People v. Banks,1 68 the court consolidated three cases to de-
cide whether a defendant is entitled to appointment of counsel
from outside of the public defender's office when the defendant
challenges the effectiveness of counsel rendered by an attorney
from the same public defender's office.1 69 In each case, the defend-
ant argued that according to People v. Smith, 70 a per se conflict of
interest results when a public defender asserts that another public
defender from the same office rendered the defendant ineffective
assistance of counsel.' 7' The defendants claimed that under these
circumstances, the public defender has conflicting loyalties be-
tween his client and his office.' 72
The court overruled the per se rule of Smith, adopting instead a
case-by-case approach to determine whether an actual conflict of
interest existed.' 73 The court then found that none of the defend-
ants put forth any evidence that demonstrated an actual conflict of
interest. 74
In People v. Wilk, 175 the Illinois Supreme Court consolidated
four unrelated cases to determine whether a defendant had re-
ceived effective assistance of counsel 7 6 when his attorney failed to
167. Id. at 132-34, 518 N.E.2d at 106-07. The court further stated that any departure
from a strict compliance with rule 401(a) did not prejudice the defendant. Id. at 132, 518
N.E.2d at 106.
168. 121 Ill. 2d 36, 520 N.E.2d 617 (1987). The cases consolidated with Banks were
People v. Blakes and People v. DuQuaine. Id. at 38-39, 520 N.E.2d at 618.
169. Id. at 39, 520 N.E.2d at 619.
170. 37 Ill. 2d 622, 230 N.E.2d 169 (1967).
171. Banks, 121 Ill. 2d at 40, 520 N.E.2d at 619.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 44, 520 N.E.2d at 621. The court recognized that a conflict of interest
among members of a law firm will disqualify the entire firm. Id. at 41, 520 N.E.2d at 619.
The court, however, distinguished the public defender's office from a private law firm,
recognizing that the loyalty one may have towards the public defender's office is too
remote to justify a per se rule. Id. (citing People v. Robinson 79 Ill. 2d 147, 402 N.E.2d
157 (1979)).
174. Id.
175. 124 Ill. 2d 93, 529 N.E.2d 218 (1988). See also ILL. S. CT. R. 604(d), ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 11 A, para. 604(d) (1987). The cases consolidated with Wilk for purposes of
this appeal were People v. Erickson, People v. Wright, and People v. Brown. Wilk, 124 Ill.
2d at 93, 529 N.E.2d at 218.
176. The decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) requires that a
defendant make two showings for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim: first, the
defendant must show that his counsel's performance fell below accepted professional
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comply with Supreme Court Rule 604(d). 77 Rule 604(d) allows a
defendant who pleads guilty to appeal if he files a motion to with-
draw his guilty plea within thirty days from entry of judgment. 7 8
In each of the four consolidated cases, the attorney for the de-
fendant failed to file a motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty
plea. 179 Accordingly, the appellate court dismissed the defendant's
appeal. 180 The defendants claimed that their attorneys' failure to
comply with rule 604(d) amounted to ineffective assistance of
counsel. '8 1
The Wilk court found that Supreme Court Rule 604(d) is a clear
rule of procedure and not merely a "suggestion" to courts and at-
torneys.'82  Therefore, the supreme court held that the appellate
court correctly dismissed the appeals."8 3 The court went on to
state, however, that the defendants had an appropriate remedy
other than an appeal. 8 4 The appropriate remedy for the defend-
ants is the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 85 which gives protection
to those petitioners whose constitutional rights have been vio-
lated.8 6 This protection extends to the sixth amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel.8 7 Furthermore, the court indicated
that if the defendants prevail in their post-conviction hearings, they
norms; second, the defendant must show that, in the absence of his counsel's errors, the
result of the trial would have been different. Id. at 687.
177. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 99, 529 N.E.2d at 220-21.
178. ILL. S. CT. R. 604(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 604(d) (1987). Rule
604(d) provides in pertinent part:
No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless
the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in
the trial court a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.
The motion shall be in writing and shall state the grounds therefor.
Id.
179. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 99, 529 N.E.2d. at 220.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 103, 529 N.E.2d at 221.
183. Id. at 107, 529 N.E.2d at 223. The court stated that the purpose of rule 604(d)
is:
[T]o ensure that before a criminal appeal can be taken from a guilty plea, the
trial judge who accepted the plea and imposed the sentence be given the oppor-
tunity to hear the allegations of improprieties that took place outside the official
proceedings and dehors the record, but nevertheless were unwittingly given
sanction in the courtroom.
Id. at 104, 529 N.E.2d at 221-22 (emphasis in original).
184. Id. at 107, 529 N.E.2d at 223.
185. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 to 122-8 (1987). A hearing under this act is
appropriate if the petition makes a substantial showing of a violation of the petitioner's
constitutional rights. People v. Rose, 43 Ill. 2d 273, 279, 253 N.E.2d 456, 463 (1969).
186. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 107, 529 N.E.2d at 223.
187. Id.
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will then be allowed to move to withdraw their guilty pleas under
rule 604(d). 88
VI. TRIAL PRACTICE
A. The Right to a Speedy Trial
In People v. Goins,i8 9 the court interpreted the jurisdictional re-
quirement of section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the
"speedy-trial" statute). 190 That statute provides that a defendant
must be tried by a court having jurisdiction within one hundred
and twenty days after being taken into custody.' 9' In Goins, the
defendant was taken into custody on July 7, 1983, in Kane County,
and charged with residential burglary. 192 Subsequently, a Kane
County grand jury indicted the defendant. 193 The ensuing investi-
gation revealed that the burglary actually took place in DuPage
County. 94 While the defendant remained in custody in Kane
County, an indictment was returned against him in DuPage
County on November 22, 1983, based on the same offense as that
charged in the Kane County indictment. 9 5  After the Kane
County indictment was dismissed, the defendant was transferred to
the custody of the DuPage County Sheriff on November 30.196 On
February 23, 1984, the defendant moved to be discharged from
custody pursuant to section 103-5(a), claiming that he had not
been tried within the 120-day limit.197 He argued that the 120-day
limit commenced when he was taken into custody in Kane
County. 1' 9  The trial court denied the defendant's motion and the
appellate court affirmed. 199
On appeal, the State contended that because the Circuit Court of
Kane County did not have jurisdiction to try the offense, the 120-
day statutory period did not begin to run until the defendant was
188. Id. at 108, 529 N.E.2d at 224.
189. 119 Ill. 2d 259, 518 N.E.2d 1014 (1988).
190. Id. at 262, 518 N.E.2d at 1015.
191. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 103-5 (1987). Section 103-5(a) provides: "Every
person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having
jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is
occasioned by the defendant .... " Id.
192. Goins, 119 Ill. 2d at 261, 518 N.E.2d at 1014.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 261, 518 N.E.2d at 1015.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 262, 518 N.E.2d at 1015.
199. Id. See People v. Goins, 136 Ill. App. 3d 582, 483 N.E.2d 702 (2d Dist. 1985).
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transferred to the Circuit Court of DuPage County.2" The State
asserted, in essence, that the legislature intended to equate jurisdic-
tion with venue for the purposes of the speedy-trial statute.2"'
The Illinois Supreme Court recognized that since 1961, the Code
of Criminal Procedure has drawn "a sharp distinction between ju-
risdiction and venue. ' 20 2 Further, the legislature intended this dis-
tinction between jurisdiction and venue to apply to the speedy-trial
statute.2°3 The court explained that the Circuit Court of Kane
County had jurisdiction over the defendant, but venue was im-
proper .2°  Therefore, the court held that the 120-day limitation
imposed by section 103-5 commenced the day the defendant was
taken into custody in Kane County.20
B. Substitution of Judge
In People v. Emerson,2 °6 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed a
case in which it had earlier reversed the defendant's murder con-
viction and remanded to the same judge who presided at the origi-
nal trial.20 7 Upon remand, the defendant filed a motion for
automatic substitution of judge pursuant to section 114-5(a) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. 20  The judge denied the defendant's
motion and the defendant was again convicted and sentenced to
200. Goins, 119 Ill. 2d at 262, 518 N.E.2d at 1015. The State relied on People v.
Rogers, 415 Ill. 343, 347, 114 N.E.2d 398, 400 (1953), which held that "the court having
jurisdiction" for purposes of the then existing speedy trial statute meant court with venue
to try the case. Goins, 119 Ill. 2d at 262, 518 N.E.2d at 1015.
201. Goins, 119 Ill. 2d at 263, 518 N.E.2d at 1015.
202. Id. at 264-65, 518 N.E.2d at 1016 (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1-6
(Smith-Hurd 1972) (committee comments, at 23)). The court noted that the decision in
Rogers was justified because the court was interpreting the speedy-trial statute at a time
when the legislature did not differentiate between venue and jurisdiction. Id. at 264, 518
N.E.2d at 1016. The court also noted that the "place of trial is not jurisdictional." Id. at
264-65, 518 N.E.2d at 1016 (citing People v. Ondrey, 65 Ill. 2d 360, 363, 357 N.E.2d
1160, 1162 (1976)).
203. Id. at 265, 518 N.E.2d at 1016.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 267, 518 N.E.2d at 1017-18.
206. 122 Ill. 2d 411, 417, 522 N.E.2d 1109, 1110 (1987).
207. See People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 502, 455 N.E.2d 41, 47 (1983).
208. Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d at 421, 522 N.E.2d at 1112. Section 114-5(a) provides in
pertinent part:
Within 10 days after a cause involving only one defendant has been placed on
the trial call of a judge the defendant may move the court in writing for a
substitution of that judge on the ground that such judge is so prejudiced against
him that he cannot receive a fair trial. Upon the filing of such a motion the
court shall proceed no further in the cause but shall transfer it to another judge
not named in the motion.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-5(a) (1987).
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death for the same offense. 2° In the second appeal, the defendant
contended that the trial judge erroneously denied the defendant's
motion for automatic substitution of judge.2 1°
In response, the State argued that the trial court was correct in
denying the defendant's motion because the defendant failed to file
the motion within ten days from the day that the cause was put on
the trial judge's call, as required by section 114-5(a). 21' The State
reasoned that the case on remand was a continuation of the origi-
nal proceeding and, therefore, the defendant could not make a
timely motion on remand.21 2
On appeal, the issue was whether the cause on remand was a
new proceeding for purposes of section 114-5(a). 213 The supreme
court indicated that a defendant must file a section 114-5(a) motion
before the trial judge makes a substantive ruling in the case and not
in response to an adverse ruling.2"4 From this perspective, the re-
mand at issue constituted a continuation of the original proceed-
ings.215 Thus, the court affirmed the trial judge's denial of the
defendant's automatic substitution of judge motion.21 6
Similarly in People v. Jones,21 7 the Illinois Supreme Court had
reversed the defendant's murder conviction and remanded the case
for a retrial to the same judge who presided at the defendant's first
trial.21 8 Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for automatic
substitution of judge and the motion was granted.219 Two days af-
ter the case was assigned to another trial judge, the defendant filed
another motion for automatic substitution of judge.220 The new
trial judge denied the defendant's motion and the defendant was
209. Emerson, 122 Ill. 2d at 421, 522 N.E.2d at 1112.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 423-24, 522 N.E.2d at 1113.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 424, 522 N.E.2d at 1113.
214. Id. (citing People v. Norcutt, 44 Ill. 2d 256, 255 N.E.2d 442 (1970)).
215. Id. Moreover, the second trial in this case was based on the same indictment as
the first trial. Id.
216. Id.
217. 123 Ill. 2d 387, 528 N.E.2d 648 (1988).
218. See People v. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d 342, 475 N.E.2d 832 (1985).
219. Jones, 123 Ill. 2d at 400, 528 N.E.2d at 654. The trial judge initially denied the
defendant's motion. Id. at 399, 528 N.E.2d at 654. The trial judge found that the case on
remand was not a new case; therefore, the motion was filed untimely. Id. Then the de-
fendant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Illinois Supreme Court, seeking
to overturn the trial judge's denial of the section 114-5(a) motion. Jones, 123 Ill. 2d at
399, 528 N.E.2d at 654. The supreme court directed the trial judge to vacate the order
and to allow the defendant's motion. Id. at 399-400, 528 N.E.2d at 654. Cf supra note
215 and accompanying text.
220. Jones, 123 Ill. 2d at 400, 528 N.E.2d at 654.
[Vol. 20
Criminal Procedure
again convicted of murder.22'
On appeal, the defendant contended that section 114-5(a) gives
an accused the right to make two successive motions for automatic
substitution of judge.2 22 The defendant reasoned that he could not
have meaningfully used the two-judge option without knowing in
advance the identity of the first two judges to whom the case would
be assigned.22a Nevertheless, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the defendant's conviction.224 The Jones court held that the plain
language of section 114-5(a) 225 contemplates the making of only
one motion, in which the defendant disclosed the identities of all
judges for whom the defendant sought substitution.226
In People v. Walker,227 the State challenged the constitutionality
of the automatic substitution of judge provision.228 In Walker, af-
ter the defendant filed a motion for automatic substitution of judge
pursuant to section 114-5(a), the State filed an objection and a
counter-motion requesting that section 114-5(a) be declared uncon-
stitutional. 229 The state's attorney contended that section 114-5(a)
infringes upon "the duty of a trial court 'to abide [by] its assign-
ments' and 'exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy before
it' " because substitution is automatic and does not require any
proof of prejudice. 230 Therefore, the state's attorney argued that
section 114-5(a) infringes upon the inherent powers of the judiciary
and violates the separation of powers provision in the Illinois Con-
stitution. 23 ' The trial judge found section 114-5(a) to be unconsti-
221. Id. at 393, 528 N.E.2d at 651.
222. Id. at 400, 528 N.E.2d at 654. The defendant relied on the portion of section
114-5(a) which states: "The defendant may name only one judge as prejudiced, pursuant
to this section; provided, however, that in a case in which the offense charged is a Class X
felony or may be punished by death or life imprisonment, the defendant may name two
judges as prejudiced." Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-5(a) (1987)).
223. Id. at 400, 528 N.E.2d at 654.
224. Id. at 428, 528 N.E.2d at 667.
225. The court focused on that portion of section 114-5(a), which states: "Upon the
filing of such a motion the court shall proceed no further in the cause but shall transfer it
to another court or judge not named in the motion." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-
5(a) (1987).
226. Jones, 123 Ill. 2d at 401, 528 N.E.2d at 654. The court took notice of a commit-
tee comment to the former version of section 114-5(a) which stated: "This section allows
one motion, but the one motion may contain the names of two judges." ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, par. 114-5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1977) (committee comments, at 253).
227. 119 Ill. 2d 465, 519 N.E.2d 890 (1988).
228. Id. at 471, 519 N.E.2d at 891.
229. Id. at 472, 519 N.E.2d at 892.
230. Id. at 478, 519 N.E.2d at 894-95.
231. Id. at 473, 519 N.E.2d at 892. The separation of powers provision provides:
"The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise
power belonging to another." ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1. The court stated that "the legisla-
19891
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tutional and the Illinois Supreme Court granted the defendant's
motion to appeal as of right.232
The Illinois Supreme Court recognized that a judge possesses no
express or inherent power to preside over a case in which that
judge's impartiality has been questioned. 23 3 Thus, section 114-5(a)
is not an unconstitutional encroachment upon the inherent powers
of the judiciary.234
C. The Right to Confront the Witness
In People v. Hernandez,235 the defendant, Hernandez, and two
co-defendants, Craig and Buckley, were charged with murder and
numerous other crimes, and were convicted in a joint trial.236
Prior to trial, the defendant moved for severance on the grounds
that the prosecution intended to introduce incriminating state-
ments made by Cruz, a non-testifying co-defendant.237 The de-
fendant relied on Bruton v. United States,238 in which the Supreme
Court held that the admission of this type of evidence violates the
ture has the power to enact laws concerning judicial practice which 'do not unduly in-
fringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary.' " Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 474, 519
N.E.2d at 892-93 (quoting People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 207, 464 N.E.2d 1059, 1063
(1984)).
232. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 472, 519 N.E.2d at 892. The trial judge took judicial
notice that in his personal experience, section 114-5(a) had become a motion for substitu-
tion of judge "not for prejudice, but for preference." Id. (emphasis in original).
233. Id. at 478, 519 N.E.2d at 895. The court stated that "[t]o hold otherwise would
be to extinguish the very 'spirit of our law, which demands that every case shall be fairly
and impartially tried, and that where any serious question exists as to prejudice on the
part of the judge he should not preside therein.'" Id. (quoting People v. Dieckman, 404
Ill. 161, 164, 88 N.E.2d 433, 434 (1949)).
234. Id. The Walker court also held that section 114-5 does not conflict with
Supreme Court Rule 21(b). Id. at 477, 519 N.E.2d at 894. Rule 21(b) provides in rele-
vant part: "The chief judge of each circuit may enter general orders in the exercise of his
general administrative authority, including orders providing for assignment of judges."
ILL. S. CT. R. 21(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. llOA, para. 21(b) (1987). The court explained
that the Chief Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit did not rely on rule 2 1(b) to promulgate
court rules for assignment of cases. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 476, 519 N.E.2d at 894.
Rather, the rules of the Sixth Judicial Circuit were established by a majority of the cir-
cuit's judges pursuant to section 1-104(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Id. (citing ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-104(b) (1987)). Therefore, section 114-5(a) could not con-
flict with rule 21(b). Id. Moreover, the court found that section 114-5(a) does not con-
flict with any other circuit rule. Id. at 477-78, 519 N.E.2d at 894-95.
235. 121 Ill. 2d 293, 521 N.E.2d 25 (1988). The defendants were each charged with
murder, residential burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated indecent liberties, devi-
ate sexual assault, and rape. Id.
236. Id. at 295, 521 N.E.2d at 26.
237. Id. at 309, 521 N.E.2d at 32.
238. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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defendant's right to confront the witness against him.2 39 The trial
court denied the motion on the ground that the statement could be
redacted to remove reference to the defendant and, thus, remove
the prejudice to him.2 4° Cruz's statement was redacted to read that
"some friends of his asked him if he wanted to be involved in a
burglary."24 ' The word "friends" was substituted for the names of
the defendant and another co-defendant.242
Following his conviction and death sentence, the defendant ap-
pealed to the supreme court, arguing that the trial court erred in
denying the motion for severance.243 The supreme court agreed
and reversed the defendant's conviction. 2" The court found that
the redaction of Cruz's statement substituting "friends" for the de-
fendant's name failed to solve the Bruton problem.245 The court
analyzed the impact of the redaction in light of the State's other
evidence and the prosecutor's comments before the jury.246 From
this perspective, the court determined that the prosecution clearly
implied to the jury that the defendant was one of the "friends"
whom Cruz referred to in his statement.247
239. Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d at 309, 521 N.E.2d at 33 (citing Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968)). The Bruton Court held that the out-of-court statements of a co-
defendant who does not testify are inadmissible at a joint trial unless all references to the
nondeclaring defendants have been redacted. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126.
240. Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d at 309-10, 521 N.E.2d at 32-33.
241. Id. at 311, 521 N.E.2d at 33.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 309, 521 N.E.2d at 32.
244. Id. at 318, 521 N.E.2d at 37.
245. Id. at 315, 521 N.E.2d at 35.
246. Id. at 314-17, 521 N.E.2d at 34-45.
247. Id. at 313, 521 N.E.2d at 34. The State argued that the use of the word
"friends" sufficiently protected the defendant's rights because Cruz's redacted statements
contained no direct reference to the defendant. Id. at 314, 521 N.E.2d at 35. The court,
however, stated that " '[a] codefendant's confession or admission does not have to ex-
pressly state that a defendant was involved in an offense; it is enough if incriminating
implications clearly point to the defendant's guilt.' " Id. at 312, 521 N.E.2d at 34 (quot-
ing People v. Duncan, 115 Ill. 2d 429, 443, 505 N.E.2d 307, 313 (1987)).
The court pointed out that Hernandez did not involve "contextual implication," which
the United States Supreme Court recently considered in Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct.
1702 (1987). Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d at 312, 521 N.E.2d at 34. In Richardson, the defend-
ant contended that her co-defendant's statement, when considered in the context of the
defendant's testimony, improperly implicated the defendant in violation of Bruton. Rich-
ardson, 107 S. Ct. at 1707. The Richardson Court held that no Bruton violation arose in
these circumstances because "the confession [had been] redacted to eliminate not only the
defendant's name, but any reference to her existence." Id. at 1709.
In People v. Cruz, 121 Ill. 2d 321, 331, 521 N.E.2d 18, 22 (1988), a companion case to
Hernandez, the court similarly held that Cruz's right to confrontation was violated by the
admission of Hernandez's confession which incriminated Cruz.
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D. Juror Misconduct
In People v. Harris,248 three defendants were charged with the
murder of one of their fellow inmates at Stateville Correctional Fa-
cility.24 9 Voir dire examination revealed that one of the prospec-
tive jurors, Beverly Nilo, had a brother-in-law, Ronald Fleming,
who was a counselor at Stateville. 250 Despite this relationship, the
trial court swore Nilo in as a juror.251
When the prosecutor subsequently learned that two of the de-
fendants had approached Fleming, the prosecutor notified the
court, which questioned Fleming in camera about his relationship
with Nilo.252 During this examination, Fleming stated that Nilo
called him the day after she was sworn as a juror and questioned
him about the murder. 3 Fleming told Nilo that "five guys with a
baseball bat" committed the killing. 254 All three defendants moved
for a mistrial. 5 The prosecution resisted, and instead requested
Nilo's dismissal from the jury. 256 Defense counsel, however, op-
posed the dismissal of Nilo and moved to re-voir dire the remain-
ing jurors to learn whether they were aware of or had been affected
by the Nilo/Fleming communication.5 7 The trial court denied the
motion for mistrial and the motion for further voir dire. Nilo
was permitted to serve on the jury, and the defendants were con-
victed of murder. 9
The defendants appealed on the basis that the communication
between Nilo and Fleming was "presumptively prejudicial."2 "
The defendants argued that they were denied a fair trial because
the trial court only conducted an inquiry of Fleming and not the
other jurors or Nilo.261
The supreme court held that the trial court's failure to conduct
further voir dire of the jury was not an abuse of discretion because
248. 123 Ill. 2d 113, 526 N.E.2d 335 (1987).
249. Id. at 124, 526 N.E.2d at 338.
250. Id. at 130, 526 N.E.2d at 342.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 131, 526 N.E.2d at 342.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 132, 526 N.E.2d at 342.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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no prejudice resulted from the communication.262 The court rea-
soned that Nilo did not learn anything from Fleming that was not
in the indictment.263 Furthermore, the court indicated that be-
cause defense counsel argued against dismissal of Nilo at trial, the
court would not find on appeal an abuse of discretion in the trial
court's refusal to dismiss Nilo. 26
E. Venue
In People v. Caruso,265 the defendant was charged with child ab-
duction and unlawful restraint after he harbored his two daughters
outside of Illinois, in violation of an Illinois court order.266 The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, asserting that
the Illinois court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.267 The defend-
ant argued that any alleged criminal conduct took place outside of
Illinois; therefore, he was not subject to the jurisdiction of Illinois
criminal courts.26 The trial court granted the defendant's motion
on other grounds and the appellate court reversed.269
The supreme court found that the defendant failed to comply
with a valid Illinois court order.270 According to the court, this
crime could be regarded as having been committed in Illinois be-
cause the offense charged was based upon an omission to perform a
duty imposed by law, as set forth in section 1-5(c) of the Illinois
Criminal Code. 27' Therefore, the court concluded that the circuit
262. Id. at 133, 526 N.E.2d at 343. The court observed that "[a] verdict will not be
set aside where it is obvious that no prejudice resulted from a communication to the jury,
either by the court or by third persons outside the presence of the defendant." Id. at 132,
526 N.E.2d at 342 (citing People v. Mills 40 I11. 2d 4, 9, 277 N.E.2d 697, 700 (1968)).
263. Id. at 134, 526 N.E.2d at 343.
264. Id. at 133, 526 N.E.2d at 343. The court stated that the defendants "cannot be
permitted to assume positions on appeal wholly inconsistent with their strategy at trial."
Id.
265. 119 Ill. 2d 376, 519 N.E.2d 440 (1987).
266. Id. at 379, 519 N.E.2d at 441.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 380, 519 N.E.2d at 442. The defendant reasoned that the essential ele-
ment of the offense of child abduction was the "taking, concealing, or detaining of [the]
child." Id. The defendant contended that he did not commit any criminal act while in
Illinois because these acts took place in Ohio, where the defendant lived with his children
for seven years prior to the entry of the court order. Id.
269. Id. at 379, 519 N.E.2d at 441. The circuit court dismissed the child abduction
counts, finding them to be an unconstitutional ex post facto application of the law. Id.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the law was not ex post facto and that the
circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction. See People v. Caruso, 152 Ill. App. 3d 1074,
504 N.E.2d 1339 (2d Dist. 1987).
270. Caruso, 119 Ill. 2d at 380, 519 N.E.2d at 441-42.
271. Id. at 381, 519 N.E.2d at 442. Section 1-5(c) provides in pertinent part: "(c) An
offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this State
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court had subject matter jurisdiction over the offense.272
VII. SENTENCING
A. Admissible Evidence
In People v. Martin,7 3 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
when sentencing the defendant for involuntary manslaughter, the
trial court committed plain error in considering as an aggravating
factor the fact that the defendant's conduct caused serious bodily
harm resulting in death.274 In vacating the defendant's sentence,
the supreme court found that the victim's death is not one of the
specified aggravating factors that a court may consider under sec-
tion 5-5-3.2 of the Unified Code of Corrections.2 75 The court rea-
soned that the legislature accounted for the victim's death when
setting the range of permissible penalties for involuntary man-
slaughter. 276 The court held that the trial court's consideration of
this factor in aggravation "clearly affected the defendant's funda-
mental right to liberty and impinged on her right not to be sen-
tenced based on improper factors. 2 77  Therefore, the court
is committed within the State, regardless of the location of the offender at the time of the
omission." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1-5(c) (1987). The court noted that section 1-
5(c) reflected the concerns expressed in Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911): "Acts
done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects
within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the
effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power." Caruso, 119 Ill. 2d at
382, 519 N.E.2d at 442 (quoting Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285)).
272. Caruso, 119 Ill. 2d at 391, 519 N.E.2d at 446.
273. 119 Ill. 2d 453, 519 N.E.2d 884 (1988).
274. Id. at 461, 519 N.E.2d at 888. In imposing the maximum statutory sentence or
involuntary manslaughter, five years of imprisonment, the trial judge stated that "in com-
mitting the felony the defendant inflicted serious bodily injury to another resulting in
death, and that a sentence [was] necessary to deter others from committing the same
crime." Id. at 457, 519 N.E.2d at 886. The appellate court, in an unpublished order,
affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence. See People v. Martin, 142 Ill. App. 3d
1178, 504 N.E.2d 551 (5th Dist. 1986).
275. Martin, 119 Ill. 2d at 459-60, 519 N.E.2d at 887 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 1005-5-3.2 (1987)).
276. Id. at 459-60, 519 N.E.2d at 887. See also People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 497
N.E.2d 1138 (1986) (trial court erred in considering victim's harm when sentencing de-
fendant for the offense of voluntary manslaughter). The court reasoned that the legisla-
ture would have clealy indicated its intent to have the victim's death considered a second
time because the death is implicit in the offense. Martin, 119 Ill. 2d at 460, 519 N.E.2d at
887.
277. Martin, 119 Ill. 2d at 458, 519 N.E.2d at 886 (citations omitted). The State
argued that the defendant had waived this issue on appeal by not raising it before the trial
court or the appellate court. Id. The court, however, invoked the plain error doctrine to
decide the issue, finding that the evidence "strongly favored leniency for the defendant."
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remanded the case for resentencing 8
B. Presiding Judge
In People v. Easley,27 9 the defendant pled guilty to reckless con-
duct, aggravated assault, and unlawful use of weapons. He was
sentenced to sixty days of imprisonment and twelve months of pro-
bation.28 ° Subsequently, the defendant's probation was revoked.28
A judge, who did not preside at the defendant's trial, sentenced
him to twelve months of probation and twelve months of periodic
imprisonment.28 2
On appeal, the defendant contended that his sentence should be
vacated because the original trial judge, who was still sitting in the
circuit where the defendant was tried, was required to preside at
the defendant's sentencing hearing pursuant to section 5-4-1(b) of
the Illinois Criminal Code. 283 The supreme court held that section
5-4-1(b) required the trial judge to preside at the revocation hear-
ing only if the judge remained in the same division and county in
which the trial was held.284 Thus, the trial judge was not required
to preside at the sentencing hearing because he was sitting in an-
other county at the time the defendant was sentenced.285
C. Probation
In People v. Williams,2"6 the circuit court sentenced the defend-
278. Id. at 463, 519 N.E.2d at 889. The court found that the degree of force used by
the defendant did not justify the increased sentence. Id. at 461, 519 N.E.2d at 888. The
court also found the sentencing judge's deterrence justification in giving a severe sentence
inherently illogical because the killing was unintentional. Id. at 459, 519 N.E.2d at 887.
279. 119 Ill. 2d 535, 519 N.E.2d 914 (1988).
280. Id. at 537, 519 N.E.2d at 915.
281. Id. at 537-38, 519 N.E.2d at 915.
282. Id. at 538, 519 N.E.2d at 915.
283. Id. at 538, 519 N.E.2d at 915. Section 5-4-1(b) provides in relevant part: "The
judge who presided at the trial or the judge who accepted the plea of guilty shall impose
the sentence unless he is no longer sitting as a judge in that court." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, para. 1005-4-1(b) (1987).
284. Easley, 119 Ill. 2d at 541, 519 N.E.2d at 916.
285. Id. at 539, 519 N.E.2d at 915. The appellate court found section 5-4-1(b) uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it violated the separation-of-powers provision of the Illinois
Constitution. People v. Easley, 152 Ill. App. 3d 839, 842, 505 N.E.2d 11, 12 (5th Dist.
1987). Specifically, the statutory provision placed an unconstitutional restriction on the
trial court. Id. The supreme court, however, refused to address the constitutionality of
the statute, finding that the issue became moot because section 1005-4-1(b) did not re-
quire the trial judge to preside at the sentencing hearing. Easley, 119 Ill. 2d at 538, 519
N.E.2d at 915.
286. 119 Ill. 2d 24, 518 N.E.2d 136 (1987).
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ant to probation for thirty months.2 8 7 On July 15, 1985, with three
months remaining on the defendant's sentence, the State filed a pe-
tition to revoke his probation.88 On March 6, 1986, the trial judge
denied the State's petition and the defendant asserted that the
judge should have declared his probation expired.28 9 The trial
court noted that even though the petition was dismissed, section 5-
6-4(a)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections 290 appeared to pre-
clude the defendant from receiving credit for time served on proba-
tion during the pendency of the revocation proceeding.9 The
statute provided that notice of a revocation hearing tolls the period
of probation until the disposition of the revocation proceeding.292
The trial court found, however, that the statute was "completely
unfair" and declared it to be unconstituional.293 Accordingly, the
trial court ruled that the defendant's probation had expired.294
On the State's direct appeal to the supreme court, the court con-
cluded that the trial court incorrectly interpreted section 5-6-
4(a)(3). 295 The court relied on its prior decision in People v. Good-
man,296 in which the court found that the purpose of the tolling
provision was to ensure that jurisdiction was retained over the pro-
bationer and that the probation did not expire before a hearing on
the petition to revoke.297 In addition to preserving jurisdiction, the
statute maintained the defendant's probationary status.198 In light
of this purpose, the Goodman court concluded that credit for time
spent during the pendency of the revocation proceeding must be
allowed.299 To hold otherwise would create the anomaly of requir-
ing the defendant to live up to the terms of his probation, while
denying him credit for doing so." Therefore, the court held that
287. Id. at 25, 518 N.E.2d at 136. The defendant pled guilty to retail theft. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-4(a)(3) (1987).
291. Williams, 119 I11. 2d at 25, 518 N.E.2d at 136.
292. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-4(a)(3) (1987). The trial court did not
articulate the basis for the statute's unconstitutionality.
293. Williams, 119 Ill. 2d at 25, 518 N.E.2d at 136.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 26, 518 N.E.2d at 137.
296. 102 Ill. 2d 18, 464 N.E.2d at 250 (1984).
297. Williams, 119 Ill. 2d at 26, 518 N.E.2d at 137 (citing Goodman, 102 Ill. 2d at 21-
22, 464 N.E.2d at 252). The State argued that Goodman was distinguishable because the
petition for revocation of Williams's probation was dismissed, whereas Goodman's pro-
bation was, in fact, revoked. Id. The court held, however, that the Goodman reasoning
applied to Williams a fortiori because the petition in Williams had been dismissed. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 27, 518 N.E.2d at 137.
300. Id.
[Vol. 20
Criminal Procedure
section 5-6-4(a)(3) did not preclude the defendant from receiving
credit for time served during the pendency of the State's revocation
petition.301
D. Death Penalty Issues
1. Factors in Aggravation
In People v. Orange,3 °2 the supreme court addressed the issue of
whether juvenile adjudications are admissible in a capital sentenc-
ing hearing as aggravating factors.3 °3 At the defendant's capital
sentencing hearing, the State introduced as aggravating factors ju-
venile adjudications for theft and burglary.3° The defense did not
submit any evidence in mitigation and the defendant was sentenced
to death.3 °5
On appeal, the defendant contended that under section 2-10(1)
of the Juvenile Court Act,3 °6 evidence of juvenile adjudications is
admissible only in sentencing proceedings conducted under the
Unified Code of Corrections. 30 7 The defendant claimed that juve-
nile adjudications are inadmissible in a capital sentencing hearing
because the capital sentencing provisions 30 are contained in the
Illinois Criminal Code and not the Unified Code of Corrections. 30 9
The supreme court found that by enacting section 2-10(1) of the
Juvenile Court Act, the legislature did not intend to prevent the
consideration of juvenile adjudications at a capital sentencing hear-
ing.310 Further, the court interpreted the reference in section 2-
10(1) to "sentencing under the Unified Code of Corrections" to
301. Id.
302. 121 Ill. 2d 364, 521 N.E.2d 69 (1988).
303. Id. at 387, 521 N.E.2d at 79.
304. Id. at 386, 521 N.E.2d at 79. The defendant was convicted of murder, conceal-
ment of a homicidal death, and aggravated arson. Id. at 369, 521 N.E.2d at 71.
305. Id. at 387, 521 N.E.2d at 79.
306. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 801-10(1) (1987). Section 1-10(1) provides: "Evi-
dence and adjudications in proceedings under this Act shall be admissible . . . (b) in
criminal proceedings when the court is to determine the amount of bail, fitness of the
defendant or in sentencing under the Unified Code of Corrections." Id. The Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 renumbered paragraph 702-10(1) as paragraph 801-10(a), but left the
substance of the provision unchanged.
307. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d at 387, 521 N.E.2d at 80. See Unified Code of Corrections,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1001-1-1 to 1008-6-1 (1987).
308. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (1987).
309. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d at 388, 521 N.E.2d at 80.
310. Id. The court recognized that it had held previously that juvenile adjudications
are admissible as aggravating evidence at a capital sentencing hearing, but none of those
cases dealt with the statutory provision that the defendant asserted in the case at bar. Id.
(citing People v. Owens, 102 Ill. 2d 88, 112-13, 464 N.E.2d 261, 267 (1984)).
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incorporate by reference the death penalty provision found in the
Criminal Code.311 Accordingly, the court upheld the defendant's
death sentence. 12
The defendant in People ex rel. Daley v. Strayhorn 313 killed a
man in Chicago on August 31, 1980.314 On January 2, 1982, he
killed another man in Rhode Island. 315 A Rhode Island court con-
victed the defendant for the Rhode Island murder and sentenced
him to forty years of imprisonment.1 6 After the Rhode Island
conviction, the defendant was extradited to Illinois where the Illi-
nois trial court convicted him for the Illinois murder.317
At the sentencing hearing, the defendant moved to preclude the
imposition of the death penalty. 31" The trial judge, the respondent
on appeal, granted the defendant's motion on the ground that the
defendant was ineligible to be sentenced to death under section 9-
l(b)(3) of the Criminal Code, which sets forth the multiple-murder
aggravating factor provision. 319 The trial judge reasoned that the
Illinois murder preceded the Rhode Island murder and murder
conviction. 32° Thus, if Illnois had tried the defendant for the Illi-
nois murder first, then the multiple murder aggravating factor
would not have made the defendant eligible for the death pen-
alty.32' Therefore, the trial court found that the Rhode Island
murder conviction could not serve as an aggravating factor under
section 9- l(b)(3).322
In reversing the trial court, the supreme court held that the
Rhode Island murder conviction could serve as an aggravating fac-
tor under section 9-1(b)(3), notwithstanding the sequence of the
defendant's acts.323 According to the court, the sequence of con-
311. Id. at 388, 521 N.E.2d at 80.
312. Id. at 393, 521 N.E.2d at 82.
313. 121 Ill. 2d 470, 521 N.E.2d 864 (1988).
314. Id. at 473, 521 N.E.2d at 865.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 474, 521 N.E.2d at 866.
319. Id. at 473, 521 N.E.2d at 865. Section 9-1(b) provides in relevant part:
(b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant... may be sentenced to death if... (3)
the defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals under
subsection (a) of this Section or under any law of the United States or of any
state which is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b) (1987).
320. Strayhorn, 121 Ill. 2d at 473-74, 521 N.E.2d at 865-66.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 474, 521 N.E.2d at 866.
323. Id. at 483, 521 N.E.2d at 870.
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victions, not the sequence of acts, determined whether section 9-
l(b)(3) applied.324 Because the Rhode Island conviction preceded
the Illinois murder conviction, the court determined that the trial
judge should have considered the Rhode Island conviction under
section 9-1(b)(3). 325
2. Constitutional Issues
In People v. Davis, 326 the defendant filed a post-conviction peti-
tion pursuant to section 122-1 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, 32 contending that the death penalty statute was being
applied in a racially discriminatory manner. 328  The defendant
proffered a statistical study known as the Gross Study,329 which
purportedly showed that a defendant convicted of murdering a
white victim was four times as likely to be sentenced to death as a
defendant convicted of murdering a black victim. 330 The defendant
argued that this racial disparity violated his constitutional
rights.33  Nonetheless, the trial court dismissed the petition with-
out a hearing.332
In affirming the trial court's dismissal of the defendant's post-
324. Id. The court relied on People v. Guest, 115 Ill. 2d 72, 104-05, 503 N.E.2d 255,
270 (1986), wherein it previously held that the sequence of convictions is controlling
when applying section 9-1(b)(3).
325. Strayhorn, 121 Ill. 2d at 483, 521 N.E.2d at 870. The court also addressed the
defendant's argument that the Rhode Island murder conviction could not be used as an
aggravating factor because the Rhode Island murder statute was not substantially similar
to the Illinois murder statute, as required by section 9-1(b)(3). 1d. at 484, 521 N.E.2d at
870. The defendant contended that the two statutes significantly differed in their defini-
tions of murder: mere recklessness is sufficient to support a conviction of murder in
Rhode Island, but the higher mens rea of gross recklessness is needed to support a mur-
der conviction in Illinois. Id. The court found that the Rhode Island murder statute was
"substantially similar" to Illinois' murder statute because, contrary to the defendant's
contention, both statutes at least required wanton recklessness to support a murder con-
viction. Id. at 487-88, 521 N.E.2d at 872. The court noted the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's holding in State v. Iovino, 524 A.2d 556, 558 (R.I. 1987), that wanton reckless-
ness is sufficient to supply the mens rea for common law murder. The Strayhorn court
found that wanton recklessness is equivalent to the mens rea requirement in section 9-
l(a)(2) of the Illinois murder statute. Strayhorn, 121 Ill. 2d at 488, 521 N.E.2d at 872.
For a further discussion of Strayhorn, see supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
326. 119 Ill. 2d 61, 518 N.E.2d 78 (1987).
327. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1987).
328. Davis, 119 Ill. 2d at 64-65, 518 N.E.2d at 80.
329. Gross & Marro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital
Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984).
330. Davis, 119 I11. 2d at 65, 518 N.E.2d at 80. The study also demonstrated that a
black defendant convicted of killing a white victim is more likely to receive the death
penalty than a white defendant convicted of killing a white victim. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 63, 518 N.E.2d at 79.
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conviction petition, the court relied on the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in McClesky v. Kemp. 333 In McClesky, the
defendant relied on a similar statistical study know as the Baldus
Study. 334 The McCleskey Court, assuming the validity of the
Baldus Study, held that the study did not establish "a constitution-
ally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital-sen-
tencing process. 33 5  Based on McClesky, the Davis court
concluded that regardless of the methodology of the Gross Study,
which was less comprehensive than the Baldus study, the Gross
Study was not sufficient to establish a violation of the federal or
state constitutions.336
Another case in which the defendant challenged the constitu-
tionality of Illinois' death penalty statute was People v. Stewart.337
In Stewart, the defendant argued in his petition for post-conviction
relief that death by lethal injection violated the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.338 The
defendant contended that there were no guidelines for administer-
ing the sentence to "protect against a torturous death. ' 339  The
trial court dismissed the defendant's petition without an eviden-
tiary hearing.3"
On appeal, the supreme court held that section 119-5 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure34' contained general guidelines relat-
ing to the method and manner of death by lethal injection.342 The
court noted the defendant's failure to offer any alternative guide-
lines or to offer authoritative support for his constitutional objec-
333. Id. at 66-67, 518 N.E.2d at 80-81 (citing McClesky v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756
(1987)).
334. McClesky, 107 S. Ct. at 1763. The Baldus Study was a complex statistical study
of 2,000 Georgia murder cases. Id.
335. Id. at 1778. The McClesky Court further held that the defendant must prove
that the decision makers in his case acted with a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 1769.
336. Davis, 119 Ill. 2d at 68, 518 N.E.2d at 81.
337. 121 111. 2d 93, 520 N.E.2d 348, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 246 (1988).
338. Id. at 112-13, 520 N.E.2d at 357.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 96-97, 520 N.E.2d at 350.
341. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 119-5 (1987). Section 119-5 provides in pertinent
part:
A defendant sentenced to death shall be executed by a continuous, intravenous
administration of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate in combi-
nation with a chemical paralytic agent until death is pronounced by a licensed
physician according to accepted standards of medical practice .... The warden
of the penitentiary shall supervise such execution which shall be conducted in
the presence of 2 physicians and 6 other witnesses ....
Id.
342. Stewart, 121 I11. 2d at 113, 520 N.E.2d at 358.
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tion to the lack of these alleged unspecified guidelines.343
Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defend-
ant's post-conviction petition. 3 "
3. Eligibility for Death Penalty
In People v. Crews,345 the court held that the statute concerning
the sentencing and treatment of defendants found guilty but men-
tally ill did not preclude the defendant from being sentenced to
death.346 On appeal, the defendant argued that the legislature did
not intend the death penalty to be imposed on those defendants
found guilty but mentally ill. 347  For instance, section 5-2-6(b) of
the Unified Code of Corrections directs the Department of Correc-
tions to "cause periodic inquiry and examination to be made con-
cerning the nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of the
defendant's mental illness. The Department of Corrections shall
provide such psychiatric, psychological, or other counseling ... as
it determines necessary. "348 The defendant argued that sentencing
a guilty-but-mentally-ill offender to death was contrary to this stat-
utory scheme.34 9 Nevertheless, the supreme court held that the
plain language of section 5-2-6(a) manifests the intention of the
legislature that the death penalty could be sought against a guilty-
but-mentally-ill defendant.35 °
343. Id. at 114, 520 N.E.2d at 358. The defendant relied on Chaney v. Heckler, 718
F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983), to support his argument that death by lethal injection consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment. Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d at 114, 520 N.E.2d at 358. In
Chaney, the defendant argued that the Food and Drug Administration ("F.D.A.")
should be required "to investigate and to regulate the unapproved use of approved drugs
in human execution systems." Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1178. The court held that the F.D.A.
could be compelled to develop these guidelines because its refusal to do so "may ...
implicate the Eighth Amemdment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at
1191. The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of appeals' decision
and held that the F.D.A.'s refusal to take enforcement action was not subject to judicial
review. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985). The Supreme Court also stated
that "[n]o colorable claim is made in this case that the agency's refusal to institute pro-
ceedings violated any constitutional rights of respondents." Id. at 838.
344. Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d at 115, 520 N.E.2d at 358.
345. 122 I11. 2d 266, 522 N.E.2d 1167 (1988).
346. Id. at 279-80, 522 N.E.2d at 1173.
347. Id. at 274, 522 N.E.2d at 1171.
348. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-6(b) (1987).
349. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d at 276, 522 N.E.2d at 1172. The defendant also argued that
section 5-2-6 reserved the sentencing function to the court, which is contrary to the role
that a jury plays in a capital sentencing hearing pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
9-1(g) (1987). Crews, 122 Ill. 2d at 276, 522 N.E.2d at 1172.
350. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d at 277, 522 N.E.2d at 1172. The court quoted section 1005-2-
6(a), which provides in pertinent part: "The court may impose any sentence upon the
defendant which could be imposed pursuant to law upon a defendant who had been con-
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4. Prosecutorial Misconduct
In People v. Gacho,5 the court held that the prosecutor's com-
ments during the sentencing hearing, which concerned the possibil-
ity of defendant's parole absent a sentence of death, deprived the
defendant of a fair sentencing hearing.352 The court found that
these statements diverted the jury's attention from the mitigating
factors.3 53  Moreover, the court reasoned that these statements
made such a strong impact on the jury that striking the statements
from the record did not cure the prejudice in the minds of the ju-
rors. 354 Therefore, the court vacated the defendant's sentence of
death and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. 355
5. Admissible Evidence
In People v. Rogers,356 the State introduced tape recorded confes-
sions of two co-defedendants during the second phase of the de-
fendant's sentencing hearing.357 Both of the confessions suggested
victed of the same offense without a finding of mental illness." Id. (citing ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-6(a) (1987)). The court observed the distinction between the
legislature's definitions of "insanity" and "mental illness." Id. at 277-78, 522 N.E.2d at
1172-73. This distinction is demonstrated in section 6-2 of the Criminal Code, which
provides: "A person who, at the time of the commission of a criminal offense, was not
insane but was suffering from a mental illness, is not relieved of criminal responsibility for
his conduct and may be found guilty but mentally ill." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 6-
2(c) (1987). The court concluded from this provision that a guilty-but-mentally-ill of-
fender is no less guilty than an offender who is guilty but not mentally ill. Crews, 122 Ill.
2d at 278, 522 N.E.2d at 1173.
351. 122 Ill. 2d 221, 522 N.E.2d 1146, cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3281 (1988).
352. Id. at 259, 522 N.E.2d at 1163. The defendant was convicted of two counts of
murder, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery, and was sentenced to death by a
jury. Id. at 229, 522 N.E.2d at 1150. The prosecutor's remarks at issue were as follows:
Mr. McDonnell [defense attorney] has thrown about some very famous names
- Gacy, Speck. Well, you know that Richard Speck was originally sentenced to
death, and he comes up for parole every two years, and one day he is going to be
out on parole .... Finally, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of all of the People,
I ask you to consider the opportunity that this man will someday have to hurt
somebody else. That's one of the things you can consider .... [A]nd consider
that some day he may have that opportunity again.
Id. at 256, 522 N.E.2d at 1162-63.
353. Id. at 257, 522 N.E.2d at 1163.
354. Id. at 257, 259-60, 522 N.E.2d at 1163, 1164 (citing People v. Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d
327, 447 N.E.2d 193 (1983)). The Szabo court stated that "[a] penalty of death that
could have been imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice cannot stand."
Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d at 367, 447 N.E.2d at 212. Furthermore, the Gacho court stated that
"the review of a death penalty case 'demands strict scrutiny of such remarks and their
possible effect upon the sentencing jury.' " Gacho, 122 I11. 2d at 259, 522 N.E.2d at 1164
(quoting People v. Walker, 91 111. 2d 502, 515, 440 N.E.2d 83, 90 (1982)).
355. Gacho, 122 I11. 2d at 264, 522 N.E.2d at 1166.
356. 123 Ill. 2d 487, 528 N.E.2d 667 (1988).
357. Id. at 519-20, 528 N.E.2d at 682. The defendant was found guilty of murder,
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that the defendant was the "real motivating party" of the crimes.358
The defendant contended, however, that the two co-defendants
were the instigators of the crimes.35 9
The supreme court found that the co-defendants' confessions
were suspect, unreliable, and highly prejudicial. 3' The court em-
phasized that although section 9-1 of the Criminal Code36 permits
the admission of evidence during the second phase of a sentencing
hearing, regardless of whether it would be admissible at trial, the
evidence must be reliable.362  The court considered a co-
defendant's statement incriminating a defendant to be "presump-
tively unreliable" because a co-defendant only stands to gain by
incriminating another defendant.3 63  Therefore, the court re-
manded the case for another sentencing hearing.364
In People v. Simms, 3 65 victim impact statements366 from the vic-
tim's family were introduced into evidence over the defense coun-
sel's objections at the sentencing hearing.367 On appeal, the
defendant contended that the admission of this evidence violated
the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. 368 The State argued, however, that the defendant waived
attempted murder, two counts of conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit
armed robbery, and armed violence. Id. at 492-93, 528 N.E.2d at 670.
358. Id. at 520, 528 N.E.2d at 683.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 521-22, 528 N.E.2d at 684.
361. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(e) (1987).
362. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d at 521, 528 N.E.2d at 683. Section 9-1(e) provides in relevant
part: "Any information relevant to any additional aggravating factors or any mitigating
factors indicated in subsection (c) may be presented by the State or defendant regardless
of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal tri-
als." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(e) (1987). The factors controlling the admission
of evidence at a sentencing hearing, which evidence is inadmissible at trial, are "relevance
and reliability." Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d at 521, 528 N.E.2d at 683 (citing People v. Lyles, 106
Ill. 2d 373, 478 N.E.2d 291 (1985)).
363. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d at 521, 528 N.E.2d at 683 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
530, 541 (1986)). Although the United States Supreme Court decided the Lee case on the
issue of whether this type of testimony is admissible for purposes of determining guilt, the
Rogers court found that this principle also applies to evidence that is admissible during a
sentencing hearing. Id. at 521, 528 N.E.2d at 683.
364. Id. at 523, 528 N.E.2d at 684.
365. 121 Ill. 2d 259, 520 N.E.2d 308 (1988).
366. Victim impact evidence is evidence concerning the victim's personal traits and
the impact of the crime on the victim's family. Id. at 271, 520 N.E.2d at 313. During the
sentencing hearing in this case, the court admitted the testimony of four of the victim's
family members regarding their grief and sense of loss. Id. at 272, 520 N.E.2d at 313.
367. Id. at 271, 520 N.E.2d at 313.
368. Id. at 271, 520 N.E.2d at 313. In Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2534
(1987), the United States Supreme Court held that introduction of victim impact state-
ments "creates an impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision will be made in
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 20
this issue on appeal because he failed to raise the issue in a post-
trial motion.369
The supreme court first recognized that notwithstanding a
waiver, the court had authority to review plain errors by the trial
court - especially those errors involving fundamental constitu-
tional rights.370 The court found that the victim impact evidence
was so powerful in this case that introduction of the evidence was
plain error in violation of the defendant's eighth amendment
rights."' Accordingly, the court reversed the death sentence and
ordered a new sentencing hearing.372
VIII. APPELLATE ISSUES
In People v. Enoch,373 the defendant claimed that he did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a jury for sentenc-
ing. 374 The State argued that the defendant had waived this issue
on appeal because he had failed to raise it in a post-trial motion as
requires by section 116-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.375
The defendant responded that the Illinois Constitution requires the
supreme court to review all sentences of death.376 Therefore, the
court has a constitutional duty to review all alleged errors even if
certain errors have not been preserved in a post-trial motion.377
The court held that the constitutional duty to review all
an arbitrary manner." The Court concluded, therefore, that the "the Eighth Amendment
prohibits a capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence." Id.
369. Simms, 121 I11. 2d at 272, 520 N.E.2d at 313. The Illinois Supreme Court held
in People v. Szabo, 113 I11. 2d 83, 93, 497 N.E.2d 995, 999 (1986), that a trial objection
and a post-conviction motion raising the issue are required to preserve an alleged issue for
appellate review. Alternatively, the State argued that the admission of this evidence con-
stituted harmless error. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d at 272, 520 N.E.2d at 313.
370. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d at 272, 520 N.E.2d at 313 (citing ILL. S. CT. R. 615(a), ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 1 lA, para. 615(a) (1987)). See also People v. Adams, 109 Ill. 2d 102,
128, 485 N.E.2d 339, 346 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986) (consideration of
improper aggravating factor in capital sentencing hearing was plain error).
371. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d at 272-73, 521 N.E.2d at 313-14. The court noted that the
United States Supreme Court has never applied the "harmless error" doctrine to affirm a
death sentence that had been challenged on the basis of a violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights during the sentencing hearing. Id. at 274, 521 N.E.2d at 314.
372. Id. at 276, 521 N.E.2d at 315.
373. 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 274 (1988).
374. Id. at 185, 522 N.E.2d at 1129.
375. Id. at 186, 522 N.E.2d at 1129 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 116-1
(1987)). See also supra note 369.
376. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190, 522 N.E.2d at 1131. The Illinois Constitution pro-
vides that "[a]ppeals from judgments of Circuit Courts imposing a sentence of death shall
be directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right. The Supreme Court shall provide
by rule for direct appeal in other cases." ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b).
377. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190, 522 N.E.2d at 1131.
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sentences of death does not relieve the defendant of his obligation
to comply with section 116-1; that section ensures that appellate
review is limited to issues of significance.378 The court then defined
the scope of its constitutional duty to review death sentences when
the defendant fails to file a post-trial motion.379 Within this scope
are constitutional issues raised at trial and issues that can be
brought later in a post-conviction hearing petition, sufficiency of
the evidence questions, and plain errors.3 8 0 Accordingly, the court
addressed the issues asserted by the defendant that fell within these
categories.3"
In People ex rel. Foreman v. Nash,382 the defendant was found
guilty-but-mentally-ill on charges of murder and armed violence. 383
The appellate court reversed, finding the defendant not guilty by
reason of insanity. 384 After exhausting its appellate remedies, the
State asked the supreme court for leave to file a complaint for an
original writ of mandamus directing the appellate court to vacate
its judgment.385 The State also sought to have the defendant's con-
viction reinstated or to have the matter set for retrial.386 Finally,
378. Id. at 190, 522 N.E.2d at 1131-32. The Enoch court explained the necessity for
the waiver rule:
Failure to raise issues in the trial court denies that court the opportunity to
grant a new trial, if warranted. This casts a needless burden of preparing and
processing appeals upon appellate counsel for the defense, the prosecution, and
upon the court of review. Without a post-trial motion limiting the considera-
tion to errors considered significant, the appeal is open-ended. Appellate coun-
sel may comb the record for every semblance of error and raise issues on appeal
whether or not trial counsel considered them of any importance.
Id. at 186, 522 N.E.2d at 1130 (quoting People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 31-32, 464
N.E.2d 223, 227 (1984)).
379. Id. at 190, 522 N.E.2d at 1136.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 192, 522 N.E.2d at 1136. The defendant claimed that statements he made
after receiving his Miranda warnings were not voluntary, that his conviction for aggra-
vated kidnapping was not supported by the evidence, that the admission of testimony
regarding other crimes allegedly committed by him constituted plain error, that he was
deprived of effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to file a post-trial
motion, and that the Illinois death penalty statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 192-202,
522 N.E.2d at 1132-37. The court rejected each of these arguments and upheld the death
sentence. Id. at 203, 522 N.E.2d at 1138.
382. 118 Ill. 2d 90, 514 N.E.2d 180 (1987).
383. Id. at 92, 514 N.E.2d at 181.
384. People v. Palmer, 139 Ill. App. 3d 966, 487 N.E.2d 1154 (2d Dist. 1985). The
appellate court noted that the defendant had an extensive history of severe mental illness
and was being treated with an antipsychotic drug at the time of the offense. Id. at 973,
487 N.E.2d at 1158. Because there was no evidentiary conflict for the jury to resolve, the
appellate court found that the State failed to refute the evidence of the defendant's sanity.
Id. at 973-74, 487 N.E.2d at 1159.
385. Nash, 118 Ill. 2d at 92, 514 N.E.2d at 181.
386. Id.
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the state sought a writ of prohibition restraining the circuit court
from entering a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity.3 s7
The State claimed that the appellate court exceeded its jurisdic-
tion.388 Specifically, it argued that the appellate court improperly
ruled on the credibility of the witnesses and-the weight of the evi-
dence, matters generally reserved for the jury.389
The supreme court held that neither a writ of mandamus, a writ
of prohibition, nor a supervisory order would be appropriate.39 °
The court recognized that a writ of mandamus and a writ of prohi-
bition are extraordinary remedies only to be used to compel as a
matter of public right a lower court to perform essentially ministe-
rial tasks. 39' Additionally, the court recognized that a writ of pro-
hibition is proper to prevent a judge from acting where he lacks
jurisdiction. 392 The court pointed out an exception to these general
rules; namely, that the supreme court may exercise its supervisory
authority in a case that presents a question " 'of sufficient impor-
tance to the administration of justice.' ,,393 The court found that
the requirements for mandamus, prohibition, or a supervisory or-
der were not satisfied in this case.394 Moreover, the court declined
to exercise its supervisory powers, indicating that the questions
presented were not of sufficient importance to the administration of
justice.395
387. Id. Article VI, section 4(a) of the Illinois Constitution gives the Illinois
Supreme Court "original jurisdiction in cases relating to... mandamus, [and] prohibition
... and as may be necessary to the complete determination of any case on review." ILL.
CONST. art VI, § 4(a).
388. Nash, 118 111. 2d at 95, 514 N.E.2d at 182.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 98, 514 N.E.2d at 184.
391. Id. at 96, 514 N.E.2d at 183. The court described its authority to grant a writ of
mandamus:
It is not the office of the writ of mandamus to review the orders, judgments on
decrees of courts for error in their rendition or to correct, direct or control the
action of a judge in any matter which he has jurisdiction to decide. For mere
error, however gross or manifest, the remedy is an appeal or writ of error, and
the writ of mandamus will not lie for its correction if the court has jurisdiction
of the subject matter and the parties.
Id. at 96-97, 514 N.E.2d at 183 (quoting People ex rel. Barrett v. Shurtleff, 353 I11. 248,
259-60, 187 N.E. 271, 276 (1933)).
392. Id. at 97, 514 N.E.2d at 183 (citing People ex rel. Daley v. Hett, 113 Ill. 2d 75,
80, 495 N.E.2d 513, 515-16 (1986)).
393. Id. at 98, 514 N.E.2d at 184 (quoting People ex rel. Bier v. Scholz, 77 Ill. 2d 12,
16-17, 394 N.E.2d at 1157, 1159 (1979)).
394. Id.
395. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that the State presented its arguments to
higher courts three times. Id. Therefore, in pursuing writs of mandamus and prohibi-
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IX. POST-CONVICTION PETITION ISSUES
In People v. Free,396 the court addressed the issue of whether a
defendant may be permitted to raise a claim in a second post-con-
viction petition if it was not raised in any of the prior proceed-
ings. 397  In his second post-conviction petition, the defendant
challenged the admission of victim impact evidence at his sentenc-
ing hearing.39 s The defendant, however, had not objected to the
admission of this evidence and had not raised this issue in his first
post-conviction petition.399
Although the supreme court recognized that the admission of
victim impact evidence would now entitle a defendant to a reversal
of his sentence under the recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Booth v. Maryland,40° it held that the defendant waived this
claim because the proceedings on the first post-conviction petition
were not fundamentally deficient." The court found that the de-
fendant was already fully afforded one occasion to demonstrate a
substantial violation of his constitutional rights in his first post-
conviction petition. 4° 2 Furthermore, the court refused to consider
tion, the State was attempting to use these extraordinary remedies as substitutes for an-
other appeal. Id.
396. 122 I11. 2d 367, 522 N.E.2d 1184, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 190 (1988).
397. Id. at 375-76, 522 N.E.2d at 1188.
398. Id. at 371, 522 N.E.2d at 1185. After the supreme court affirmed the defend-
ant's conviction, People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 447 N.E.2d 218 (1983), the defendant filed
a petition for post-conviction relief. Free, 122 I11. 2d at 370, 522 N.E.2d at 1185. The
trial court dismissed the petition and the supreme court affirmed that decision. Id. See
People v. Free, 112 11. 2d 154, 492 N.E.2d 1269 (1986). In 1986, the defendant filed a
second post-conviction petition, which the trial court also dismissed. Free, 122 Ill. 2d at
370, 522 N.E.2d at 1185.
399. Free, 122 Ill. 2d at 373, 522 N.E.2d at 1186.
400. 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987). The Free court noted that after the court heard oral
arguments, the Supreme Court decided Booth. Free, 122 Ill. 2d at 374, 522 N.E.2d at
1187. For a discussion of Booth, see supra note 367.
401. Free, 122 11. 2d at 376, 522 N.E.2d at 1188. The court noted that section 122-3
of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 122-3 (1987), "contem-
plates the filing of only one post-conviction petition." Free, 122 Ill. 2d at 375, 522 N.E.2d
at 1188. Section 122-3 provides: "Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights
not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 122-3 (1987). Moreover, according to People v. Richeson, 50 Ill. 2d 46, 48, 277
N.E.2d 134, 136 (1971), "a ruling on a post-conviction petition has resjudicata effect
with respect to all claims that were raised or could have been raised in the initial peti-
tion." Free, 122 Ill. 2d at 376, 522 N.E.2d at 1188. The Free court acknowledged, how-
ever, that a defendant may be entitled to multiple post-conviction petitions when the
proceedings on the original petitions were fundamentally deficient. Id. (citing People v.
Nichols, 51 Ill. 2d 244, 281 N.E.2d 873 (1972)).
402. Free, 122 Ill. 2d at 376-77, 522 N.E.2d at 1188 (citing People v. Logan, 72 Ill. 2d
358, 370, 381 N.E.2d 264, 270 (1978)).
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the defendant's claim by applying the plain error rule.4 3 The
court reasoned that to apply the plain error standard to the defend-
ant's procedurally defaulted claims in a post-conviction proceeding
would "deny the State's legitimate interest in the finality of the
defendant's convictions, which this court affirmed in 1983 on di-
rect appeal.''I
After filing a post-conviction petition in People ex rel Daley v.
Fitzgerald,4 5 the defendant filed subpoenas for the taking of dis-
covery depositions of persons involved in the defendant's trial. 40 6
The State moved to squash these subpoenas. 40 7 The State argued
that a court may order the taking of evidence depositions, but not
discovery depositions in a post-conviction proceeding.',,
The trial court denied the State's motion to quash three of the
subpoenas.4°9 Subsequently, the State filed a motion in the Illinois
Supreme Court for leave to file a complaint for writ of mandamus
or prohibition, or for a supervisory order compelling the trial judge
to vacate the orders allowing the subpoenas.41 °
The supreme court recognized that the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act is silent on the availability of discovery depositions and that
the rules governing civil discovery and criminal discovery do not
pertain to proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.41'
403. Id. at 378, 522 N.E.2d at 1189 (citing ILL. S. CT. R. 615(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
I10A, para. 615(a) (1987)).
404. Id. The court observed that the nature of a post-conviction proceeding is collat-
eral to a judgment of conviction and is not designed to provide another appeal. Id. at
377, 52 N.E.2d at 1188. For support, the court looked to the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982), that the plain error standard was "out
of place when a prisoner launches a collateral attack against a criminal conviction after
society's legitimate interest in the finality of the judgment has been perfected by the expi-
ration of the time allowed for direct review or by the affirmance of the conviction on
appeal." In separate dissents, Justices Simon and Clark argued that because admission of
victim impact evidence violates a defendant's substantive rights under Booth, it is funda-
mentally unfair to sustain the defendant's sentence on a doctrine of waiver. Free, 122 Ill.
2d at 381-91, 522 N.E.2d at 332-36 (Simon and Clark, JJ., dissenting).
405. 123 Ill. 2d 175, 526 N.E.2d 131 (1988).
406. Id. at 177-78, 526 N.E.2d at 132.
407. Id. at 178, 527 N.E.2d at 132.
408. Id. at 178, 526 N.E.2d at 133. The State contended that the supreme court's
decision in People v. Rose, 48 Ill. 2d 300, 268 N.E.2d 700 (1971), interpreted section 122-
6 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-6 (1987), to
preclude the taking of discovery depositions in post-conviction petition proceedings. Fitz-
gerald, 123 Ill. 2d at 180, 526 N.E.2d at 133. In Rose, the supreme court affirmed the
trial judge's refusal to compel the witnesses to attend the discovery depositions sought by
a post-conviction petitioner. Rose, 48 Ill. 2d at 302, 268 N.E.2d at 702.
409. Fitzgerald, 123 I11. 2d at 178, 526 N.E.2d at 132.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 180-81, 526 N.E.2d at 133-34. The court found that the rules governing
civil discovery do not apply to post-conviction petitions because such application would
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Finding no rules that govern discovery during a post-conviction
proceeding, the court held that a trial judge has the inherent au-
thority to allow the taking of discovery depositions after con-
ducting a hearing. 412 The court found that Judge Fitzgerald was
acting within his inherent authority to permit these depositions.41 3
In People v. Bates,41 4 the court held that a shortened limitation
period for bringing a post-conviction petition could be applied ret-
roactively to a conviction occurring prior to the provision's enact-
ment.4"' On December 13, 1972, the defendant was convicted of
murder and faced a sentence of up to seventy-five years of impris-
onment.41 6 In 1972, the statute of limitation for a post-conviction
petition was twenty years.4"' On January 1, 1984, an amendment
to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act took effect which shortened
the limitation period to ten years."' Then on February 6, 1984,
five weeks after the effective date of the amendment and eleven
years after the defendant's conviction, the defendant filed a pro se
petition for post-conviction relief.419 The trial court dismissed the
defendant's petition because it was untimely and the appellate
court reversed.42 °
On appeal, the defendant argued that the amendment should not
"invite, at least in the discovery stages, the relitigation of matters that were conclusively
determined in the original proceedings in the trial court and on appeal." Id. at 182, 526
N.E.2d at 134. Likewise, the court found that criminal discovery rules should not apply
because Supreme Court Rule 411, ILL. S. CT. R. 411, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para
411 (1987), restricts the rules to felony prosecutions. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d at 182, 526
N.E.2d at 134. The court concluded that because the remedy provided by the Post-Con-
viction Petition Hearing Act does not fall into either a strictly criminal or civil category,
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is sui generis. Id. at 181, 526 N.E.2d at 134 (citing
People v. Clements, 38 Ill. 2d 213, 230 N.E.2d 185 (1967)).
412. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d at 183, 526 N.E.2d at 135. The supreme court found that
Rose did not bar the taking of discovery depositions in a post-conviction proceeding. Id.
at 180, 526 N.E.2d at 133. Rather, the court in Rose merely "held that the reference to
depositions in section 122-6 ... pertained only to evidence depositions." Id.
413. Id. at 183-84, 526 N.E.2d at 135.
414. 124 Ill. 2d 81, 529 N.E.2d 227 (1988).
415. Id. at 84, 529 N.E.2d at 228.
416. Id. at 83, 529 N.E.2d at 228.
417. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1971)).
418. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (Supp. 1984)). Section 122-1 as
amended states: "No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 10
years after rendition of final judgment, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the
delay was not due to his culpable negligence." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1
(1987).
419. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d at 84, 529 N.E.2d at 228.
420. Id. See People v. Bates, 152 Ill. App. 3d 1163, 515 N.E.2d 1066 (1st Dist. 1987).
The appellate court held that when limitations are shortened so as to instantaneously bar
petitions that fall outside the new limitation period, those defendants affected must be
given a reasonable time to file. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d at 84, 529 N.E.2d at 228.
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be applied retroactively.4 2' In the alternative, the defendant con-
tended that he should have been entitled to file his petition within a
reasonable time after the amendment's effective date, arguing that
the court should create a safety valve for those petitions that were
instantaneously barred by this enactment.422
The supreme court concluded, however, that the shortened limi-
tation period should be applied retroactively.4 23  The court then
rejected the defendant's safety valve argument.424 It found that the
legislature included a safety valve in section 122-1 by qualifying the
ten-year limitation period with an exception for "culpable negli-
gence. 4 25 The defendant's petition failed to allege a lack of "cul-
pable negligence," and the court, therefore, reversed the appellate
court and dismissed the defendant's petition.
4 26
In People v. Porter,427 the court consolidated three cases to ad-
dress the issue of whether section 122-2.1 of the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act428 is unconstitutional.4 29 In Porter, the defendants
421. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d at 85, 529 N.E.2d at 229.
422. Id. at 86, 529 N.E.2d at 229. In Meegan v. Village of Tinley Park, 52 Ill. 2d
354, 359, 288 N.E.2d 423, 426 (1972), the supreme court held that the legislature may
validly shorten the time to bring a pre-existing cause of action if "a reasonable time exists
for the presentation of a claim after enactment of [the] statute."
423. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d at 86, 529 N.E.2d at 229. In People v. Orlicki, 4 Ill. 2d 342,
354, 122 N.E.2d 513, 519 (1954), the court retroactively applied a reduced limitation
period for bringing a claim under the Dram Shop Act. The Orlicki court reasoned that
because the legislature created the rights under the Dram Shop Act, the legislature had
the corresponding power to repeal those rights. Id. at 353, 122 N.E.2d at 518. Moreover,
the power to repeal statutory enactments includes the lesser power to modify time limita-
tions for bringing actions under them. Id. The Orlicki court also noted that statutes of
limitations are procedural in character and that procedural amendments are generally
applied retroactively. Id.
The defendant in Bates contended that Orlicki should not apply to the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act. Bates, 124 Il1. 2d at 85, 529 N.E.2d at 229. The defendant relied on People
v. Lansing, 35 Ill. 2d 247, 220 N.E.2d 218 (1966), in which the court refused to apply
rectroactively an amendment to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act that lengthened the
limitation period. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d at 86, 529 N.E.2d at 229. The Bates court, however,
distinguished Lansing by recognizing the distinction between cutting off a cause of action
by applying a shortened statute of limitation period, and reviving a cause of action by
lengthening the statute of limitation. Id. The court stated: "In most jurisdictions the
general rule is laid down, without exception or qualification, that, after an action has
become barred by an existing Statute of Limitations, no subsequent legislation will re-
move the bar or revive the cause of action." Id. (quoting Lansing, 35 Ill. 2d at 250, 220
N.E.2d at 220).
424. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d at 88-89, 529 N.E.2d at 230-31.
425. Id. at 88, 529 N.E.2d at 230. The court noted that it is very possible that the
"culpable negligence" exception could be "a more expansive right to post-conviction re-
lief than a 'reasonable time' rule." Id.
426. Id. at 90, 520 N.E.2d at 231.
427. 122 Ill. 2d 64, 521 N.E.2d 1158 (1988).
428. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-2.1 (1987). Section 122-2.1 provided:
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filed pro se post-conviction petitions.43 0 The trial court found these
petitions to be patently without merit and dismissed them pursuant
to section 122-2.1. 431
On appeal, the defendants contended that section 122-2.1 un-
constitutionally conflicts with Supreme Court Rule 651(c), 432 in vi-
olation of the doctrine of separation of powers.433  The Illinois
Supreme Court found the defendants' argument to be without
merit because rule 651 (c) deals specifically with appeals from post-
conviction proceedings.4 34 Section 122-2.1, on the other hand, per-
tains to an indigent petitioner's right at the trial level.435 Thus, no
conflict can exist between provisions that address the appointment
of counsel at different levels in the post-conviction process.43 6
Holding that section 122-2.1 does not violate the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers,437 the court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal
(a) Within 30 days after the filing and docketing of each petition the court
shall examine such petition, and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section.
If the court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it
shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the finding of fact and
conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such order of dismissal is a
final judgment and shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail within
10 days of its entry.
Id.
429. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 70, 521 N.E.2d at 1159. The court consolidated People v.
Singleton and People v. Mason with Porter.
430. Id. at 69, 521 N.E.2d at 1159.
431. Id.
432. ILL. S. CT. R. 65 1(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 65 1(c) (1987). Rule 651
provides in pertinent part: "Record for Indigents; Appointment of Counsel. Upon the
timely filing of notice of appeal in a post-conviction proceeding, .... the trial court...
shall appoint counsel on appeal .... " Id.
433. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 71, 521 N.E.2d at 1160. The defendants claimed that the
record on appeal following a dismissal of a pro se petition without appointment of coun-
sel does not satisfy the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 65 1(c). Id. at 72, 521 N.E.2d
at 1160. The defendants reasoned that Rule 651(c) required the appellate record of a
post-conviction proceeding to show that the appointed counsel of the petitioner has met
certain procedural requirements at the trial level. Id. According to the defendants, the
appellate record must show that the appointed counsel at the trial level has: "(1) con-
sulted with petitioner to ascertain his contention of deprivations of constitutional rights,
(2) examined the record of the proceedings at the trial, and (3) has made any necessary
amendments to the pro se petition for an adequate presentation of the petitioner's conten-
tion." Id. The defendants argued that these requirements of Rule 651(c) cannot be
squared with section 122-2.1. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. The court indicated that section 122-2.1 gave rise to no separation of powers
violation because "appointment of counsel at the hearing stage of the post-conviction
proceeding [is] a legislative matter." Id. at 72-73, 521 N.E.2d at 1160 (citing People v.
Ward, 124 Ill. App. 3d 974, 464 N.E.2d 1144 (4th Dist. 1984)).
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of the defendants' post-conviction petitions.438
X. LEGISLATION
A. Sentencing
Public Act 85-349 added a new paragraph to Section 5-5-3.2 of
the Unified Code of Corrections. 439 The amendment permits a
court to impose an extended term for the first degree murder of a
peace officer or a fireman acting in the course of his official du-
ties.440 The State must establish that the defendant knew or should
have known that the victim killed was a peace officer or fireman."
A defendant convicted of committing a felony while on pre-trial
release now is subject to a consecutive sentence." 2 Public Act 85-
258 provides that the sentence imposed for that felony shall be
served consecutive to any sentence imposed for the previous felony
convictions. 44 3 The sentences are to be served consecutively, re-
gardless of the order in which the judgments of conviction are
entered. 4
The Illinois Legislature, by enacting Public Act 85-1003, re-
moved a sentencing court's discretion regarding another consecu-
tive sentence provision in the Unified Code of Corrections. 44 1
Pursuant to Public Act 85-1003, a sentencing court now must im-
pose a consecutive sentence if the defendant is convicted of a class
X or class 1 felony involving severe bodily injury or is convicted of
criminal sexual assault." 6
438. Id. at 86, 521 N.E.2d at 1167. The court also found that section 122-2.1 does
not violate the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions and does not
violate the doctrine of equal protection. Id. at 73-78, 521 N.E.2d at 1161-63.
Finally, the defendant contended that section 122-2.1 is not severable from section 122-
8, which was held to be unconstitutional in People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36, 495 N.E.2d
501 (1986), and, therefore, is void. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 78, 521 N.E.2d at 1163. Section
122-8 required that a judge other than the trial judge hear a post-conviction petition. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-8 (1987). The court found these provisions to be severable
because they were distinct and operated independently of each other. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at
80, 521 N.E.2d at 1164.
439. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
440. Id. This amendment does not apply to a defendant sentenced to death or to a
term of natural life imprisonment. Id.
441. Id.
442. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-4 (1987).
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-4(a) (1987).
446. Id.
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B. Sex Offenses
Public Act 85-688 amended section 12-18 of the Criminal Code
to increase compensation to sexually-abused victims." 7 Pursuant
to this amendment, a court may order the sex offender to pay all or
a portion of the victim's expenses for medical or psychiatric
treatment."4
Public Act 85-872 amended the habitual criminal statute. 4 9 The
amendment added a conviction for criminal sexual assault under
paragraph 12-13 450 as an offense that will qualify the defendant as
an habitual criminal.4 '
C. Arrest and Trial Procedure
Public Act 85-388 amended section 114-12 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure45 2 to provide for a "good faith" exception to the Illi-
nois exclusionary rule. At a hearing on a defendant's motion to
suppress evidence, the State may now submit evidence of a peace
officer's objective and reasonable good faith belief that his conduct
was proper.45 3 The court may deny the defendant's motion if it
finds that the peace officer acted in good faith in seizing the
evidence.454
447. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-18(d) (1987).
448. Id. The crimes subject to this provision are defined in sections 12-13 through
12-16 of the Criminal Code. Id.
449. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33B-1 (1987).
450. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-13 (1987).
451. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33B-1 (1987). A conviction for a class X felony or
for first degree murder will also qualify a defendant as an habitual criminal. Id.
452. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-12 (1987).
453. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-12(b)(1) (1987). In establishing this "good
faith" exception, the Illinois Legislature essentially tracked two recent United States
Supreme Court decisions. In United States v. Leon, 484 U.S. 897, 913 (1984), the Court
held that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by
a police officer acting in "good faith" pursuant to a warrant that is ultimately found to
lack probable cause. Similarly, the Court recently held that the exclusionary rule does
not apply to evidence obtained during a warrantless search, which is conducted pursuant
to a statute that is later declared to be unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160,
1167-68 (1987).
454. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-12(b)(1) (1987). The legislature defined good
faith to mean whenever evidence is obtained by a police officer:
(i) pursuant to a search or an arrest warrant obtained from a neutral and de-
tached judge, which warrant is free from obvious defects other than non-delib-
erate errors in preparation and contains no material misrepresentation by any
agent of the State, and the officer reasonably believed the warrant to be valid; or
(ii) pursuant to a warrantless search incident to an arrest for violation of a
statute or local ordinance which is later declared unconstitutional or otherwise
invalidated.
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Public Act 85-463 amended the statute regarding the method of
trial.45 5 In a criminal prosecution, in which the only offense
charged is first degree murder, a class X felony, or criminal sexual
abuse, a jury trial is mandatory unless both the State and the de-
fendant submit a waiver in writing. 56 Before this amendment, the
defendant alone could waive a jury for any of those offenses.457
According to Public Act 85-236, a person arrested pursuant to a
warrant must now be taken to the nearest and most accessible
judge in the county where the arrest took place.4 58 No longer must
the arrestee be brought before the judge who issued the warrant.
XI. CONCLUSION
The length of this Survey Article illustrates the great weight of
criminal procedure issues on the Illinois Supreme Court's docket.
Out of this multiplicity of issues arise two areas that deserve spe-
cial emphasis: the rights of the accused under the fourth and fifth
amendments, and the death penalty. In analyzing the rights of the
accused, the court continued to follow the lead of the United States
Supreme Court, rather than to explore the possibility of different,
perhaps broader, interpretations under the Illinois Constitution.
Yet, the court generally interpreted Supreme Court tenets to the
defendant's advantage.
Justice Clark in People v. White459 wrote a veritable primer on
the application of the Payton rule and the "fruit of the poisonous
tree." He knocked down one prosecution argument after another,
finding that the defendant possessed "standing" to contest the war-
rantless entry of the police into his brother's home to arrest him;"
that no exigent circumstances existed;4 61 and finally, that there was
no attenuation of the "taint" of his arrest,462 so that his later con-
fession had to be excluded. Justice Clark further emphasized that
although a Payton violation occurs when the warrantless entry oc-
curs, a confession given later at the police station is the fruit of that
violation even though the confession is not elicited in the home
455. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-1 (1987).
456. Id.
457. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-1 (1985).
458. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 109-1 (1987).
459. 117 Ill. 2d 194, 512 N.E.2d 677 (1988). See supra notes 1-22 and accompanying
text.
460. White, 117 111. 2d at 210-16, 512 N.E.2d at 682-85.
461. Id. at 318-20, 512 N.E.2d at 686-87.
462. Id. at 223, 512 N.E.2d at 688.
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itself.46 3 The prosecution had tried to limit that application of Pay-
ton to in-home confessions.
In the application of Miranda principles, defendants won some
and lost some. The court seemed to back away from its earlier
decision in People v. Smith.46 5 The court in Smith held that there
can be no waiver under Miranda if the police do not inform an
accused in custody that his lawyer had tried to see him.466 After
Smith, the United States Supreme Court concluded that waiver
was possible in a similar situation in Moran v. Burbine,467 on the
theory that what the suspect does not know (i.e., his lawyer is try-
ing to see him) cannot affect whether his waiver is knowing and
voluntary.468
The court in People v. Holland 4 69 upheld a finding of waiver in
circumstances where Smith seemed to dictate that no waiver was
possible. The court distinguished Holland from Smith on the
ground that the defendant in Smith had retained counsel, who at-
tempted to see him, whereas Holland was unaware that a relative
had retained counsel for him.47 ° Thus, the holding in Burbine
governed.4 7 1
In analyzing problems posed when a defendant asserts his rights
under Miranda, the court strictly applied Miranda's requirements
to the prosecution's benefit in one case and to the defendant's in
another. For instance, in People v. Foster,472 police confronted the
defendant, who had exercised his right to remain silent some time
earlier, with the news that a witness had implicated him in the
crime.4 3 The defendant then confessed.474 The court concluded
that in this sequence of events, the police had "scrupulously
honored" the defendant's right to cut off questioning.47
463. Id. at 228, 512 N.E.2d at 690.
464. Id.
465. 93 Il. 2d 179, 442 N.E.2d 1325 (1982).
466. Id. at 189, 442 N.E.2d at 1329.
467. 476 U.S. 412 (1986).
468. Id. at 422-23.
469. 121 Ill. 2d 136, 520 N.E.2d 270 (1987). See supra notes 67-77 and accompaning
text.
470. Holland, 121 Ill. 2d at 151-53, 520 N.E.2d at 277.
471. Id.
472. 119 Ill. 2d 69, 518 N.E.2d 82 (1987). See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying
text.
473. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d at 86, 518 N.E.2d at 89.
474. Id.
475. Id.
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In contrast, the court in People v. St. Pierre47 6 examined a con-
fused dialogue between a suspect and the police during a custodial
interrogation and concluded that the defendant had asserted his
right to counsel under Miranda.477 The court turned a deaf ear to
the prosecution's argument that the defendant's further response to
interrogation was an initiation by him of a conversation about the
crime and, therefore, a waiver under Edwards v. Arizona.4
Finally, during the Survey period there were several opinions ad-
dressing a congeries of issues involving the death penalty. The
death penalty withstood attack on numerous constitutional
grounds. For instance, the court found that the death penalty was
not being imposed in a racially discriminatory manner,479 and that
death by lethal injection is not cruel and unusual punishment.480
This year, as last year, the court showed its reluctance to declare
any part of the Illinois death penalty statute unconstitutional.
The court reaffirmed that the touchstone for admissibility of evi-
dence in the penalty phase of a death penalty sentencing hearing
(as contrasted with the eligibility phase) is reliability. The court
reversed a death sentence in People v. Rogers48' on the ground that
admitting a co-defendant's confession was error given the inherent
unreliability of such statements." 2 In People v. Simms,48 3 the court
reversed a death sentence on the ground that admission of "victim
impact" evidence constituted plain error.484 The court, closely fol-
lowing the United States Supreme Court decision in Booth v. Mary-
land,4"' found that the emotional impact of such evidence
undermines the reliability of the death penalty determination. 8 6
With respect to eligibility factors for the death penalty, the court
found that a person who is found guilty-but-mentally-ill of a quali-
476. 122 Ill. 2d 95, 522 N.E.2d 61 (1988). See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying
text.
477. St. Pierre, 122 Ill. 2d at 111, 522 N.E.2d at 68.
478. Id. at 113, 522 N.E.2d at 68.
479. People v. Davis, 119 Ill. 2d 61, 518 N.E.2d 78 (1987). See supra notes 326-36
and accompanying text.
480. People v. Stewart, 121 Il. 2d 93, 520 N.E.2d 348 (1988). See supra notes 337-44
and accompanying text.
481. 123 11. 2d 487, 528 N.E.2d 667 (1988). See supra notes 356-64 and accompany-
ing text.
482. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d at 521-22, 528 N.E.2d at 684.
483. 121 Ill. 2d 259, 520 N.E.2d 308 (1988). See supra notes 365-72 and accompany-
ing notes.
484. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d at 272-73, 520 N.E.2d at 313-14.
485. 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987).
486. Simms, 121 Ill. 2d at 272-72, 520 N.E.2d at 313-14.
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fying homicide is eligible for the death penalty.487 The court found
as well that for purposes of using multiple murders as the eligibility
factor, it is the sequence of convictions for murder which governs,
not the sequence of the homicides themselves.488
Perhaps the most significant development in criminal procedure
during the Survey period occurred not in the supreme court, but in
the Illinois General Assembly where the legislature enacted a
"good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule in certain circum-
stances. 489 This exception essentially follows recent United States
Supreme Court opinions that provide for such an exception. For
instance, the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence seized by
police officers pursuant to a warrant that is later found to lack
probable cause.49° Similarly, the Supreme Court recently held that
the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained during a
warrantless search, which was conducted pursuant to a statute that
is later declared unconstitutional. 491
The Illinois Supreme Court has previously implied that it would
follow United States Supreme Court interpretations of search and
seizure principles.492 This new statute will undoubtedly be chal-
lenged and will provide the court in the near future with the oppor-
tunity further to explore the relationship between the Illinois
Constitution and the Constitution of the United States in the area
of criminal procedure.
487. People v. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d 266, 522 N.E.2d 1167 (1988). See supra notes 345-
50 and accompanying text.
488. People ex reL Daley v. Strayhorn, 121 Ill. 2d 470, 521 N.E.2d 864 (1988). See
supra notes 313-25 and accompanying text.
489. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-12 (1987). See supra notes 452-54 and accom-
panying text.
490. United States v. Leon, 484 U.S. 897, 913 (1984).
491. Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 1167-68 (1987).
492. See People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 245, 469 N.E.2d 147, 157 (1984).
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